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Abstract
While a vast literature has been collected pointing out the role
of the human capital on economic growth, a few has been
said, in Economics, on the mechanism through which educa-
tion directly impacts on democracy. The present dissertation
proposes a novel microfoundation of this nexus based on the
paramount role of education as economic growth engine and
determinant of political participation. The first two works
introduce elements of political psychology in order to shed
lights on individual cognitive process that might favor, over-
all, a culture of democracy. Education is then a cognitive tool
that citizens/voters can use to decode the information con-
tent of political signals and to keep rulers in charge account-
able. We formally show that the entire initial distribution of
education matters for a successful democracy and that the
median is pivotal in the political process. Motivated by that
in the last work we propose a statistical analysis of the distri-
bution of the Italian primary school service. Primary schools
tend to distribute in a complex way according to geographical
features of the territory, schooling aged population density,
and possible interactions between the two. Despite the school
system is financed at a State level, we outline the persistence
of remarkable differences not directly attributable to histor-
ical divergences among different macro-area of the country
but rather between montane areas and more dynamic regions
deputed to explain economic and political divergences.
Chapter 2
We propose a political agency model where rent-maximizer
rulers are constrained by sophisticated principals/producers
that use an awareness-management model a` la Be´nabou and
Tirole. Sophistication is explained by educational attainments
and producers are endowed with different levels of educa-
tion, that increase over time with human capital investments.
We allow education to be both the engine of growth and a
determinant of political participation; in equilibrium, more
educated societies are more able to punish politicians that,
in turn, invest more in productive public goods such as in-
frastructure, roads or legal rules for contracts enforcement.
We prove the existence of multiple steady states featuring, re-
spectively, a sophisticated society with congruent politicians
in office, and a naive society ruled by dissonant politicians.
Finally, we address inequality concerns and show how, for
intermediate values, inequality opposingly hits citizens and
ruler and only the latter is found to better off; conversely, cit-
izens are averse to inequality, contributing to explain, via so-
phisticated accountability, why most people dislike living in
a society which is too unequal.
Chapter 3
The paper originally attempts to explain the rise of the new
wave of populism in Europe and the persistence of the Latin
American populism. Such phenomena rose an unresolved
political puzzle according to which populist politicians has
been widely supported by the electorate while ultimately hurt
the economic interests of the majorities. We address this puz-
zle by looking at the electorate side and, specifically, at indi-
vidual citizens that are endowed with different level of po-
litical sophistication. According to the Political Psychology
literature, we approximate political sophistication in terms of
individual education attainments whose distribution evolve
over time with human capital investments. In each period,
the distribution of political sophistication within a country
generates different incentive structure for the incumbent that
accordingly optimally decide whether to be a populist or a re-
sponsible type whereas between countries might determine
completely different equilibria in the long run, one with pop-
ulist politicians and one ruled by responsible ones. I argue
that rent-maximizer politicians have the chance to behave in a
populist fashion when a naive electorate fail in keeping rulers
politically accountable. Despite citizens are politically com-
mitted to responsible economic policy, naive voters are basi-
cally unaware of the politicians intentions providing to the
latter opportunities for the manipulation of the economy and
the electoral outcome. Populist rulers carry out inefficient in-
vestment with the only intent to induce a mean-increasing
spread in future distributions of human capital so as to in-
crease electoral consensus based on a naive electorate and to
maximize tax revenues based on a few of rich.
Chapter 4
We characterize the statistical law according to which Ital-
ian primary school-size distributes. We find that the school-
size can be approximated by a log-normal distribution, with
a fat lower tail that collects a large number of very small
schools. The upper tail of the school-size distribution de-
creases exponentially and the growth rates are distributed
with a Laplace PDF. These distributions are similar to those
observed for firms and are consistent with a Bose-Einstein
preferential attachment process. The body of the distribution
features a bimodal shape suggesting some source of hetero-
geneity in the school organization that we uncover by an in-
depth analysis of the relation between schools-size and city-
size. We propose a novel cluster methodology and a new
spatial interaction approach among schools which outline the
variety of policies implemented in Italy. Different regional
policies are also discussed shedding lights on the relation be-
tween policy and geographical features.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Almost thirty years have passed by from the time the Nobel prize Robert
E. Lucas wrote ‘On the Mechanics of Economic Development’in 1988 in the
JME. From that time, several researches have repeatedly stressed the
paramount importance of the human capital for the developing of a coun-
try. Investment in human capital generate spillover effect on the econ-
omy reducing the diminishing return to capital accumulation. According
to such literature, differences in growth rates across countries are mainly
attributable to differences in the rates at which those countries accumu-
late human capital over time.
A few has been rather said in Economics about the role of human cap-
ital in politics. Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) represents one of the first
attempt on this matter. In their model, Oligarchy helps poor in acquir-
ing education to rise up its payoffs via educational externalities. Only
educated persons are allowed to take part to political decisions and, as
a result, the education process of the poor segment of the society favors
the extension of the franchisee that, in turn, lowers the Oligarchy’s polit-
ical power and privileges. In this fashion, education is both the engine of
growth and a determinant of political participation.
While the fact that education was a determinant of political partic-
ipation was a novelty for the economic theory, in Political Science that
was a milestone. In 1959 Lipset already identified two mechanisms by
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which education promotes democracy: (a) education enables a culture of
democracy and, at the same time, (b) it leads to greater prosperity, which
is also thought to cause political development. What exactly means a cul-
ture of democracy and the way education directly impacts on democracy
is something still debating.
There have been however several empirical works that have docu-
mented the existence of a significant (conditional) correlation between
education and democracy. Without addressing any causal relation be-
tween the two, Barro (1999) and Przeworsky et al. (2000), have provided
evidence consistent with the view popularized by Lipset (1959), whereas
Glaeser et al. (2004) further investigated the empirical nexus arguing that
differences in schooling are a major causal factor explaining not only dif-
ferences in democracy, but more generally in political institutions. In-
troducing country fixed effects, Acemoglu et al. (2005) have challenged
this view by showing that higher levels of (average) education within a
country are not significantly associated with higher achievements in the
democratization process.
The point risen by Acemoglu et al. (2005) has been recently reverted
by Castello´-Climent (2008) who stresses that what really matters for the
implementation and sustainability of democracy is an increase in the ed-
ucation attained by the majority of the population rather than the aver-
age years of schooling.
Why does the median of the distribution matter? And why does the
mean fail in identifying the relationship between education and democ-
racy within a country? The reason relies on the statistical features of the
average, that might suffer from the presence of outliers or because of fat
tails in the distribution, and on psychological features involved in the
relationship ruler/citizen. In unequal societies, such as Latin American
countries, the poorest segment are basically impeded to get educated, be-
cause of a liquidity constraint, whereas the Elite´ attend the best schools
in the country optimally investing in human capital. In other countries,
where for example the school system is publicly financed, primary and
secondary education is mandatory and that does include the poor. In
the latter case, (relatively) rich and (relatively) poor attend same schools,
contributing to explain why such (more integrated) societies are dynam-
ically better at reducing heterogeneity (see Benabou, 1996; Glomm and
Ravikumar, 1992). While the mean hides such differences, the resulting
political equilibrium might be surprisingly different among such coun-
tries.
The second reason that might contribute to explain why the median
matters stands on cognitive process that involve political decisions of
every citizens. Education is a cognitive tool that citizens/voters can use
to decode the information content of political signal and to keep rulers
in charge accountable. While education generates spillover on the eco-
nomic system, increasing the marginal return to human capital accumu-
lation, it is also deputed to generate political externalities that might fa-
vor a culture of democracy. A well-functioning democracy consists of
free elections and, once the ruler is in office, of check and balances nec-
essary to maintain that culture. One of the informal check and balances
is the political accountability effort that each citizen exerts to control the
task of the government. When the majority of the voters is able to con-
trol the actions of the rulers, politicians are said to be accountable and the
accountability turns to be politically sophisticated.
Despite political sophistication has been generally ignored as a source
of heterogeneity in voting in the Political Economy literature, a number
of researchers, within the field of Political Psychology, broadly discussed
in Section 2.1, have repeatedly stressed the importance of cognitive so-
phistication in shaping an individual’s ability to make political and eco-
nomic evaluation (Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh, 1988; Sniderman,
Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Zallen, 1992; McGraw, 2000; Gomez and Wil-
son, 2001; Federico and Sidanius, 2002). These works point out that more
educated citizens are less likely to be cheated by politicians.
This dissertation consists of three essays. The first two of them ad-
dress the theoretical nexus between education and democracy. Chap-
ter 2 provides a framework to analyze the relationship between a selfish
politician in office and different citizens/voters, endowed by different
level of education, that, according to his own level of education, codify
the signal (the announcement on public investment) sent by the ruler dif-
ferently. The rent maximizer ruler draws information rents by announc-
ing the wrong state of the world to credulous citizens by claiming that
investments are not viable when they actually are. Chapter 2 provides
a rationale for the rise and persistence of dissonant rulers (always sig-
naling the wrong state) in naive societies and congruent rulers (always
signaling the right state) in sophisticated societies, describing conditions
for multiplicity of the equilibria.
Chapter 3 extends this idea to a symmetric scenario in which, tough
investment are not feasible, populist and reckless politicians get to office
in naive societies by claiming big change for the better are possible and
that they can make them happen. Chapter 3 additionally addresses the
theoretical puzzle on the sustainability over time of populist regimes and
on why the majority bring support to a populist ruler if, in the long run,
he leads them to poverty. Multiple equilibria are characterized, one for
naive societies ruled by populist rulers and one for sophisticated soci-
eties run by responsible politicians.
Should Government emphasize education then? Motivated by the
first two Chapters, in Chapter 4 I statically analyze the way the Italian
primary school system works and, particularly what kind of education
is provided in different part of the Country, despite school autonomy
and school competition have nowadays formally granted. Since the dis-
tribution of education matters for the economy and a well-functioning
democracy also the distribution of the school service must be taken into
account by the social planner in order to avoid social stratification and
inequality. Primary schools tend to distribute in a complex way accord-
ing to geographical features of the territory, schooling aged population
density, and possible interactions between the two. Despite the school
system is financed at a State level, Chapter 4 outlines the persistence of
remarkable differences not directly attributable to historical divergences
among different macro-area of the country but rather between montane
areas and more dynamic regions.
Chapter 2
Sophisticated Electoral
Accountability: A Political
Psychology Agency Theory
2.1 Introduction
Imagine two hypothetical voters. One is exceedingly well informed about poli-
tics, a daily and devout reader of the New York Times, who follows closely the
major issues of the day, both national and international. The second, a Daily
News fan, is hardly overburdened by the amount of time, or effort, she devotes
to public affairs – in fact, looks only at the sports page and cares next to nothing
about politics. Is it plausible to suppose that these two voters, asked to make a
choice about who should be president of the United States, would make up their
minds in the same way?
Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) at p. 165
Standard political agency models focuses on elections as an incentive
devices through which voters discipline politicians. After the seminal
papers by Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986), second generation models
start to combine hidden action and different types of politicians in order
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to address political selection issues. Politicians may differ among them in
their competence (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1989, Banks and Sundaram,
1993), or in their motivation (Besley and Case, 1995, Coate and Morris,
1995, Fearon, 1999, and Rogoff, 1990)1. Besley (2006) proposes the dis-
tinction between dissonant and congruent rulers, arguing that the latter
are more able/willing to give voters what they want.
Although these issues are undoubtedly important, they naturally raise
the questions of why a politician should behave congruently or disso-
nantly and why in some countries rulers perform better than in others.
As Figure 2.1 points out, countries around the World widely differ in
terms of WGI Government Effectiveness. On one side, developed coun-
tries rank on the first quintile of the worldwide distribution. The first
ranked country in 2010 is Finland, followed by Singapore, Denmark and
Sweden where public and civil services, the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the policy formulation and implementation are
thought of to be of the highest quality, whereas the government’s com-
mitment to such policies the most credible (Kaufmann, Kray, and Mas-
truzzi, 2010). On the other side, the last ranked countries are mostly de-
veloping countries to a great extent located in the sub-Saharan African
area (drawn in white in Figure 2.1). What is deputed to explain such a
worldwide pattern?
Adding to the puzzle is the fact that most of developing countries
leaders are not less competent than those of developed countries, at least
in terms of education background, since most of them graduated in U.S.
or European universities. This is the case for example of the longest serv-
ing ruler of the African continent, Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo,
ruling over the Equatorial Guinea since the 1979 when he overthrew his
uncle in a bloody coup d’etat after having successfully completed his
studies in Spain. He is followed, in terms of ruling duration, by the Pres-
ident of Angola, Jose´ Eduardo dos Santos who brilliantly graduated in
engineering in Soviet Union. Forbes also includes the King of Swaziland,
1For a complete review of the literature see Persson and Tabellini (2000), Grossman and
Helpman (2001), Besley (2006), and Ashworth (2012).
Figure 2.1: The WGI Government Effectiveness worldwide distribution.
King Mswati III, graduated in United Kingdom2, whereas David Wal-
lechinsky in ‘Tyrants: The Worlds 20 Worst Living Dictators’put firmly
in discussions the credibility of the elections organized by Robert Biya,
President of Cameroon, who years before studied at Sorbonne and Sci-
ences Po in Paris. But many other similar examples involve similar coun-
tries across the developing world.
In this paper I argue that rent maximizer politicians rule congruently
public business when a sophisticated electorate account for it and behave
dissonantly when they are allowed to. Despite political sophistication
has been generally ignored as a source of heterogeneity in voting in the
Political Economy literature, a number of researchers have repeatedly
stressed the importance of cognitive sophistication in shaping an indi-
vidual’s ability to make political and economic evaluation (Abramowitz,
Lanoue, and Ramesh, 1988; Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, 1991; Zallen,
1992; McGraw, 2000; Gomez and Wilson, 2001; Federico and Sidanius,
2002). These works, related to the Political Psychology literature, point
out that more educated citizens are less likely to be cheated by politi-
cians. Education provides political sophistication which is meant to give
2From the article ‘The Five Worst Leaders In Africa’, Forbes, September 2, 2012.
individuals ability in making political evaluations. I model Political Psy-
chology predictions by allowing sophisticated voters to perfectly know
which is the type of the politician they are facing of (that is whether he
is a congruent type or a dissonant one) whatever the signal the latter
chooses to send. In this sense, fully sophisticated voters are not involved
in any asymmetric information issues that rather interest the rest of the
electorate. On the other side, naive voters are basically unaware of the
politicians type and intentions providing to the latter opportunities for
the manipulation of the economy. However, as far as sophisticated citi-
zens are the majority, manipulation would be hard to be carried out. In
between, a continuum of citizens take economic and political decisions
driven by their own political sophistication, the prior belief upon the
state of nature, and the codification of the signal sent by the politician.
I propose a dynamic signaling political model where citizens/voters
are endowed by different level of education and, according to his own
level of education, each of them codifies the signal (the announcement
on public investment) sent by the ruler differently (see Be´nabou and Ti-
role, 2002). In every period, the principal-agent game develops as fol-
low: there are two states of nature about the efficiency level of the State
in providing a productive public good. In one of them, a very small
amount of the good will be provided either because the State is weak or
because exogenous shocks bind fiscal policy3. On the other side, pro-
ductive investments could support private activities, but this possibility
is under ruler’s full discretion. Once the policymaker starts the office
comes to know what is the realization of the state, which is then private
information and unknown to citizens. After the information is received
3One of the plausible interpretation for that is the theory, proposed by Migdal (1988)
and Herbst (2000), and nicely investigated by Acemoglu (2005), according to which weak
states have a limited capacity to tax and regulate. On the other end, strong states im-
pose high taxes and invest more. Another plausible interpretation is given by exogenous
shocks hitting the economy. Examples are oil supply shocks (that hit western European
economies during the seventies), new fiscal rules on budget balance (see the European
monetary union), the intervention of international agencies like IMF or World Bank. High
public debt levels, inherited from previous governments, may also impede rulers to carry
out any public investment. The resulting weakness undermines any discretionary power
of the ruler who never has the incentive to cheat the electorate.
he sends a (costless) signal to citizens that, in turn, use the education to
screen the plausibility of the announcement. On the basis of the posterior
beliefs, citizens optimally choose how much invest in human capital and
whether to reelect the incumbent or not. Therefore, we take the screening
process, driven by political sophistication and education attainments, to
identify the implicit effort that each individual devotes to the account-
ability of politicians.
Despite no costs are involved in signaling, the cheap talk (or bab-
bling) equilibrium is reached only by sophisticated citizens when the
sender behaves dissonantly, always revealing the wrong state. In other
words, if the government is looked at as an untrusted one, sophisticated
citizens will not pay any attention on the signal it sent. However, in any
other cases, the signal still conveys information although the content mi-
ght be misleading by inducing naive citizens to guess public investment
are viable when actually they are not. The ruler does want to cheat citi-
zens, in some state of the world, in order to invest less in a not-directly
observable productive public good and appropriating what is left of the
tax revenues by rents. However, reducing public investments amounts
to shrink tax revenues and, indirectly, his (eventual) future rents heading
himself toward a binding trade-off4. On the other side, citizens do pre-
fer more public investments that increase individual productivity and,
indirectly, the education attainments. The role of citizens as voters is to
account for the policymaker job making sure that he invests when he can.
Less investments would mean for citizens an income loss, that of course
they do want to avoid. Once the incumbent ruler is thought to be dishon-
est by the majority of the voters he will be punished ex post with another
(identical) politician (see also Ferejohn, 1986). Therefore, how democracy
works in equilibrium is determined by the accountability effort pushed
by voters that is in turn based on the overall level of sophistication of the
society.
Unlike the existing works in political agency, I take one step further
by endogeneizing agent’s types (dissonant versus congruent) and polit-
4Something similar is found in Bourguignon and Verdier (2000) where oligarchy helps
poor in acquiring education to rise up its payoffs via educational externalities but, at the
Figure 2.2: The causal relation timing. In every time period, the politician in charge
optimally responds to the educational level of the median citizen. eit is inherited
from previous periods according to the law of motion eit+1 = (1−delta)eit+hit. The
private investment level in human capital is, in turn, affected by the behavior of the
ruler shaping the educational path {eik}∞k=t+1 of the society.
ical choices as best responses of the sophistication rate of the electorate.
In equilibrium I found the ruler’s congruence rate to be increasingly de-
pendent on the educational level of the median voter who is found to
be pivotal. This allows us to address the puzzle stated at the begin-
ning explaining away why in some countries rulers perform better than
in others. The idea, sketched in Figure 2.2, is that more educated so-
cieties are more able to punish politicians that, in turn, invest more in
infrastructure, roads or legal rules for contracts enforcement. These pro-
ductive public goods foster private investment in education (or human
capital) making future accountability more effective. The combination of
the accumulation and political mechanism creates the potential for mul-
tiple steady states, one for low-education societies with dissonant rulers
and one for high-education societies with congruent rulers. Similarly
to Be´nabou (2000), we show how exogenous shocks can move countries
from one equilibrium to another. For example, a financial crisis can make
the fiscal budget constraint tighter so as to impede new productive pub-
lic investments. Anticipating that, citizens reduce human capital invest-
ments. If the crisis is persistent enough, the resulting lack of investment
will lead the society to loose sophistication (the median citizen moves
left), giving politicians more chances to behave dissonantly. This mech-
anism could contribute to explain several historical events such as the
advent of totalitarian regimes in the aftermath of the World War I as
same time, extending the franchisee lowers its political power and privileges.
the penalties imposed to Germany by the treaty of Versailles (what John
Maynard Keynes defined a Carthaginian peace) can be seen as a huge
(persistent enough) fiscal shock.
Behind this mechanism, there is the assumption that more educated
citizens are less likely to be cheated by politicians. This is quite in tune
with a large strand of literature that crosses behavioral economics, polit-
ical science, and psychology that stresses the importance of cognitive so-
phistication in shaping an individual’s ability to make political and eco-
nomic evaluation5. Despite political sophistication has been generally ig-
nored as a source of heterogeneity in voting, in much of the political psy-
chology literature, sophistication, awareness, and education are used al-
most interchangeably (see Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock (1991) and Za-
llen (1992)). In this fashion, the ability to keep politicians responsible can
be thought of as a function of education, since educated voters are bet-
ter able to perceive the influence of government policies and macroeco-
nomic fluctuations on their own economic fortunes (Abramowitz, Lanoue,
and Ramesh, 1988).
Our main contribution to the existing literature is to provide a general
framework that incorporates into the political agency models some as-
pects of political psychology. Since public investment are not directly ob-
served, both economic and voting decisions are indeed driven by beliefs
that are updated through an awareness-management model a´ la Be´nabou
and Tirole (1999, 2002). According to that citizens are not equally aware
about what is going on and only some of them are fully bayesians. We
call them sophisticated citizens; sophisticated citizens know what is the
congruence rate of the politician, though they can be minoritarian in the
society. Asymmetric information about the extent to which rulers are dis-
sonant only involves economic and political decisions of naive citizens,
that, when majoritarian, give rent maximizer politicians the chance to
5See, among others, Abramowitz, Lanoue, and Ramesh (1988) and more recently Gomez
and Wilson (2001). For a complete review on political psychology see McGraw (2000).
More related to the political science literature and political business cycle is the pioneer
work by Chappel and Keech (1984), that firstly introduces the distinction between naive
and sophisticated voters where the former are basically unaware of economic constraints
faced by politicians who, in turn, have the opportunities for manipulation of the economy.
manipulate the economy. The model is also general enough to allow sev-
eral extensions. One of them consider the incentive structure of populist
politicians to promise public investments, for electoral purposes, even
though there is no room for investing. We also look at the term limit ef-
fect in naive societies, arguing that a longer carrier horizon might not be
sufficient to induce rulers to behave congruently.
The second contribution relies on the introduction into political agency
models of heterogeneity on the principal side. Though heterogeneity
complicates things a bit, the model leads to tractable analytic results. In
particular, in line with Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Be´nabou (1996,
2000, 2002), we allow citizens to have different education endowments
lognormally distributed. Also the distribution of wealth remains lognor-
mal and closed-form solutions are obtained. Contrary to what has been
proposed before in political agency literature, no representative agent
has been characterized but, in equilibrium, the median citizen is found
to be pivotal, consistently with the median voter theorem. The median
citizen also provides a measure of the general level of sophistication (or
naivite´) of the society leading to a straight intuition of political results
and comparative statics.
Our results are partially consistent with the modernization theory
that emphasizes the role of education in promoting democracy6. On the
one hand, education is found to be crucial in shaping democratic institu-
tions via accountability. On the other hand, however, initially low edu-
cated societies fail in providing democratic institutions, and, even worst,
bad governments are found to be persistent due to a persistent low level
of accountability. This endogenous nexus – theoretically developed in
this paper – is captured by Figure 2.3, that scatters countries’ educational
level over the WGI Government Effectiveness index, as measure of good
government, for 80 democracies. In Panel a the cross-country uncondi-
tional correlation is shown outlining several clusters of countries: con-
solidated democracies with high levels of education, in the South-East
6Lipset (1959) identifies two mechanisms by which education promotes democracy: (a)
education enables a culture of democracy and, at the same time, (b) it leads to greater
Figure 2.3: Education attainments and government effectiveness for N = 80 de-
mocracies over the period 1990-98 (observations are averaged over the considered
period). Data are taken from Persson and Tabellini (2000). Education attainments are
defined as the total enrollment in primary and secondary education, measured as a
percentage of the relevant age group in the population, computed dividing the num-
ber of pupils (or students) enrolled in a given level of education regardless of age
by the population of the age-group which officially corresponds to the given level
of education, and multiplying the result by 100. The governance indicators are from
Kaufmann et al. (2010). It ranges from around 0 to around 10 (lower values cor-
respond to better outcome). In Panel a I scatter the education attainments over the
Government Effectiveness index. In Panel b the Government Effectiveness index is
conditioned to the logarithm of the real GDP per capita in 1960. The relationship
remains statistically significant.
corner, that more than a century ago have embarked a joint virtuous evo-
lution of institution and political sophistication; minimalist democracies
with low level of education, in the North-West corner, that started the de-
mocratization process accompanied by a low sophistication ending up in
the worst equilibrium (Bidner, Francois, and Trebbi, 2014); countries in
between that are still in the middle of the democratization process tend-
ing to either equilibria. In Panel b I show that the relationship also stands
after controlling for (the logarithm of) the GDP per capita in 1960.
prosperity, which is also thought to cause political development.
There is, in addiction, a wide selection of empirical works that have
documented the link between the distribution of education and democ-
racy. Some of them, notably Barro (1999) and Przeworsky et al. (2000),
have provided evidence consistent with the view popularized by Lipset
(1959), whereas Glaeser et al. (2004) further investigated the empirical
nexus arguing that differences in schooling are a major causal factor ex-
plaining not only differences in democracy, but more generally in politi-
cal institutions. Introducing country fixed effects, Acemoglu et al. (2005)
have challenged the view that high educational standard is a prerequi-
site for a country to become a democracy. This conclusion has been re-
cently reverted by two subsequent papers, Bobba and Coviello (2007)
and Castello´-Climent (2008). In particular, Castello´-Climent stresses that
what really matters for the implementation and sustainability of democ-
racy is an increase in the education attained by the majority of the popu-
lation rather than the average years of schooling. A measure of the distri-
bution of education has been included in the regression making sure that
education attainments are yielded by the less educated fraction of popu-
lation. This last work is much closer to what we do in this work, given
that the median of the distribution defines the general level of sophisti-
cation of the society whereas in equilibrium it is found to be pivotal.
The paper is also related to other strands of literature. Beside the
aforementioned literature on political agency, there is a growing litera-
ture on signaling in elections that draws attention to the role of the politi-
cian’s platform choice to signal to voters his type (Banks (1990), Harring-
ton (1993)). Kartik and McAfee (2007) study a Hotelling-Downs model of
electoral competition where a fraction of candidates have character and
are exogenously committed to a campaign platform (different from the
median voter position). Callender and Wilkie (2007) develop a general
electoral framework in which the willingness to lie varies across candi-
dates and discuss the implications of cheap-talking on signaling equilib-
ria. More recently, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2013) expand this idea
arguing that honest politicians, in order to get reelection, choose populist
policies (defined as policies to the left of the median voter) as a way of
signaling that he is not beholden to the interest of the rich elite. None of
these papers discuss or derive the politicians’ credibility or attitude to lie
as a best response of the electorate sophistication.
Secondly, the paper relates to the literature that emphasizes the com-
plementarity of the investment by the State and the investment by the
citizens. Contributions include Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992), Benhabib et al. (2001). We use that framework to shed lights
on the importance, in democracy, of good politicians in driving economy
through public investment. Bad politicians, on the other side, draw rents
wiping out private incentive to invest. The endogenous growth mech-
anism and the accumulation of human capital has been widely studied
by Lucas (1988), Galor and Zeira (1993), Durlauf (1996), Gradstein and
Justman (1997), Saint-Paul (1994). Most directly related are the mod-
els in Be´nabou (1996, 2000, 2002) where producers have different level
of human (or physical) capital, lognormally distributed; the accumu-
lation and the redistributive mechanisms dynamically interact pushing
different unequal societies to different equilibria (social contracts). Here
we build on Be´nabou’s framework to clarify dynamic interaction be-
tween election (or political participation) and the accumulation process.
In this sense, our work is also close in spirit to Bourguignon and Verdier
(2000) in which an oligarquic society is split up into an initially unedu-
cated poor class that do not participate to political decisions that are only
taken by a rich elite; more equal societies democratize sooner because the
higher are the incentive for an educated elite to subsidize the poor’s ed-
ucation, that, in turn, gain political control. Similarly to Bourguignon
and Verdier (2000), we allow education to be both the engine of growth
and a determinant of political participation. By doing that we show how
more educated societies are more able to punish politicians that, in turn,
invest more in productive public goods. In the stationary state, countries
initially educated reach an upper bound in education and wealth. Others
persist in a ignorance trap7.
7Ashworth, Bueno de Mesquita and Friedenberg (2013) similarly speak of accountabil-
ity traps that are driven by bad expectations. In an accountability trap a polity is caught
in a self-reinforcing pattern of behavior with low accountability and – without changing
institutions – another self-reinforcing pattern of behavior with greater accountability and
higher voter welfare exists.
The chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we shall intro-
duce the main features of the model, namely preferences and beliefs, and
voting rules. The Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium will be charac-
terized in Section 2.3, firstly discussing how the accumulation process
is affected by the institutional setting (the ruler’s congruence rate) and
then endogeneizing political choices as best responses of the sophistica-
tion rate of the electorate (via accountability). We then discuss the effect
of inequality on the players’ payoffs. Section 2.4 discusses the dynamic
implication of the political economic interaction and multiple equilibria
are characterized. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The model
2.2.1 Technology and preferences
An incumbent policymaker competes against the opponent to stay in of-
fice. In absence of term limits, office guarantees to incumbents a lifetime
flow of rents
Ur0 = T0 −BG0 + E0
∞∑
t=1
βt(Tt −BGt)ϕt−1 (2.1)
conditionally of being in office in time t. ϕt is a state variable of the econ-
omy, given at time t = 0 and equals to 1 if r is the incumbent. Yet, ϕt
endogenously evolve over time: at the end of every period t election are
held and voters are called for to retain the incumbent or to replace him
with a challenger, that is to choose an action ϕt = {0, 1}. Rents are com-
posed by tax revenues Tt the citizens pay to benefit from a productive
public good that costs B to the administration, plus future discounted
incomes, conditionally of being reelected, i.e. ϕt−1 = 1. Gt = {0, 1} is an
indicator function equals to 1 if the public investment has been made in
time t.
The opponent running against the incumbent is identical in all re-
spects from the viewpoint of the voters. Thus the only reason for not
reappointing the incumbent is to punish him ex post by taking off future
rents, and since the opponent is identical it is indeed (weakly) optimal
for the voters to carry out this punishment8.
The politician in office rules over a continuum of unit mass of risk
neutral infinitely-lived citizens endowed with different initial educational
levels, ei0, normalized to 0 ≤ ηi0 ≡ ei0/e¯ ≤ 1, where e¯ can be larger or
equal to the maximum of the education distribution. The distribution of
ηi0 is initially exogenous according to F (ηi0) and evolves (endogenously)
across periods on the basis of the following law of motions:
eit+1 = (1− δ)eit + hit (2.2)
where hit is investment (effort) in human capital carried out to accumu-
late human capital that in turns persists over time with rate 1 − δ. De-
spite educational differences, all citizens use the same (Cobb-Douglas)
technology to transform individual effort in the unique final good in the
economy to be consumed according to (2.4):
yit = G
γ
t−1(e
i
t)
α (2.3)
cit ≤ (1− τt)yit −
1
φ
(hit)
φ (2.4)
where (1/φ)(hit)φ are convex costs in investing hit in education, given that
φ ≥ 2. In order to get analytical results, we allow investing to be equally
costly for every skilled citizens despite the most skilled ones are expected
to exert less effort in learning. Yet, γ, α > 0 are the elasticity of the pub-
lic and private investment on the output, respectively9: in this fashion,
investment by the state is complementary to the investments of citizens
(accordingly to Barro (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Benhabib
et al. (2001)). Production is carried out by the citizens, but it depends
8This basically amounts to rule out the case in which the ruler provides the public good
without being reelected. Furthermore, since challengers are of the same type imposing that,
when indifferent, voters reelect the incumbent is costless.
9In principle, any values of γ could be allowed albeit for γ ≤ 0 citizens do not care
in public sector weakening the attention toward politician announcements (for example,
γ = 0 means that public investments are no longer productive). Furthermore, negative
values of γ commute Gt to be a bad that is not so far from what has been observing in
on their investments as well as on the quality of the infrastructure, the
strength of the law and order, or yet on the legal rules for contract en-
forcement. All these factors are determined by the public good invest-
ments made by the politician and his decision to not carry out public
investments sharply leads citizens to not plan any private investments
(see Acemoglu (2005)). A proportional taxation scheme is levied by the
ruler to collect tax revenues, Tt = τtyt, aimed to invest in a productive
public good (i.e. Gt = 1) and to remunerate the politician in charge ac-
cording to (2.1). The investment made in period t will be productive in
the subsequent period t + 1 so that the accountability effort carried by
citizens for having a properly use of public money falls together with an
increase in future consumption flows.
Finally, all citizens discount the future with factor β (the same of the
politician) and have the same additive (across states and across time)
lifetime utility function
U i0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βtcit (2.5)
that only depends on consumption cit, defined above.
2.2.2 Information and beliefs
There are two state of nature about the efficiency level of the State in
providing a productive public good, σt = {H,L}. In state L, a very
small amount of the good will be provided (GLt ≈ 0). On the other side,
productive investments could support private activities in state H , but
this possibility is under ruler’s full discretion (i.e. GHt = {0, 1})10. Once
the policymaker starts the office comes to know what is the realization
of σt, which is then private information and unknown to citizens who
have common prior P (σt = H) = q11. After the information is received
many developing countries (e.g. by running wars).
10Using the Acemoglu (2005) set-up, in σt = L the state is weak with a limited capacity
to tax and regulate (i.e. τˆL ≈ 0). In σt = H , conversely, strong states may arise imposing
high taxes and invest more (0 << τˆH < 1). See footnote 3. That means that all the insights
of the model will come up from the state H .
11The assumption of common prior is not crucial, and is only done to highlight the effect
the policymaker sends a signal to citizens, σˆt = {H,L}, assessing the
capability of the State in providing Gt. The ruler can have the incentive
to cheat citizens by signaling L when the true state is σt = H . In such
a way, he can pocket public savings for himself by larger rents12. This
reasoning also implies that in state L he never has the incentive to cheat,
that amounts to say that P (σˆt = L|σt = L) = 1.
Due to the asymmetric source of information, the role of citizens as
voters is to account for the policymaker announcement making sure that
he invests less in state L and more in state H13. Preventing to be cheated
requires a minimum level of sophistication and awareness about the politi-
cians’ purposes that not all of them possess. In what follows, we assume,
in line with the political psychology literature (discussed in the introduc-
tion), that more sophisticated voters are those more educated in society
whereas naive people are the uneducated, even though naivete can be ex-
emplified by other characteristics like inexperience, innocence, simplic-
ity. Then, according to his own level of education eit each citizen codifies
the signal sent by the ruler differently. The idea is that education helps
us to convey all the essential informations to make inference. ηit = eit/e¯
captures this intuition:
• ηit = 1⇔ eit = e¯ stands for an individual i who behaves as a perfect
bayesian agent with all the information in hands;
• ηit = 0 ⇔ eit = 0 stands for an individual i who is fully naive
and believes that the ruler tell the truth whatever the state of the
of educational level on the inferential process.
12This is the short run gain obtained by choosing Gt = 0 so as the cost of public invest-
ment,BGt, is zero. In addiction, there is a more subtle gain which operates in the long run:
due to imperfect credit markets, not investing today in Gt impedes the citizens to invest,
in turn, in human capital which, for every δ > 0, amounts to move the median voter to the
left of the distribution becoming more credulous.
13The consequences of temporary information asymmetries are investigated also by Ro-
goff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990). They argue that politicians use to manipulate cer-
tain not-observable macroeconomic policy variables in the imminence of the vote, to in-
crease the probability of being reelected. Herrington (1993) goes further stressing the role
of voters’ uncertainty on which policy is best, though no one as far as we know shape the
role of voters’ naivite´.
world14.
In σt = H , the ruler can either tell the truth to citizens (and investing
GHt = 1) or tell a lie (GHt ≈ 0). Each citizen i knows the congruence rate
0 ≤ λt ≤ 1 of the policymaker according to his own level of education. It
follows that only the perfect bayesian citizen (i.e. with ηit = 1) can predict
with certainty the true rate of the policymaker; less educated citizens can
only know a fraction of his intentions, whereas fully naive agents (i.e.
with ηit = 0) believe what the ruler tells whatever the state of the world.
The probability that he is cheating (or dissonance rate) is for citizen i then
equal to:
P (σˆit = L|σt = H) = (1− λt)ηit (2.6)
whereas the probability that the government says the truth (or congru-
ency rate) is:
P (σˆit = H|σt = H) = 1− (1− λt)ηit (2.7)
where λt = 1 stands for a politician that always tells the truth, and λt = 0
for one that always tells a lie.
Using an awareness-management model a` la Be´nabou-Tirole (Be´nabou
and Tirole, 2002) each citizen i assesses the plausibility of the policy-
maker’s claiming: Is it plausible that the state is inefficient (or weak)?
Are the policymaker cheating us investing less in education and increas-
ing office rents? The probability that the policymaker will cheat is for
citizen i equal to15:
pit(λt, η
i
t, q) ≡ P (σt = H|σˆit = L;λt, ηit)
=
(1− λt)ηitq
1− q + (1− λt)ηitq
(2.8)
It turns out that (1 − λt)ηit ≤ 1 implies that pi ≤ q. The babbling
equilibrium where pi = q is reached iff λt = 0 and ηit = 1: if the govern-
ment is looked at as a untrusted one, citizens will not pay any attention
14See Be´nabou and Tirole (2002) and Be´nabou (2011) for a discussion about bayesian
behavior and naivete and the way to model it in a standard microeconomic model.
15A number of posterior distributions are drawn in Appendix for different F (ηi), priors,
and λ. See Figures 2.11-2.15.
on the signal it sent (see Be´nabou and Tirole, 1999, 2002) and classify it as
a cheap talkers16. However, such a level of awareness can be caught by
only the most educated agents in society. If λt is still null but ηit < 1, the
agent will be led to throw away some degree of awareness (or sophisti-
cation) in the inferential process. In this sense, the government has some
interests in decreasing ηit, to make its moves wider.
2.2.3 Voting
Citizens vote retrospectively according to the evidence they have col-
lected on political announces. Since the government’s strategy is realized
only after the elections, only individual beliefs are involved in the infer-
ential process. Every citizen i processes all the informations collected
and votes again for the incumbent if she has no evidence of the fraud, i.e.
iff the evidence Et in favor of the hypothesis pit is not positive17:
E(pit) ≡ log
( pit
1− pit
)
≤ 0 (2.9)
which occurs where pit ≤ 1/2. It in turn means that if the majority of them
has no evidence about the cheating move of the policymaker he will be
reelected, contingency that occurs when P (pit ≤ 1/2) = F (1/2) ≥ 1/2.
Now, given 0 ≤ pmt ≤ q with F (pmt ) = 1/2, we require that
F
(1
2
)
≥ 1
2
= F (pmt )⇐⇒ pmt ≤
1
2
(2.10)
by monotonicity of F (·). In other words, it turns out that the policymaker
won’t be reappointed if the median citizen thinks that he is plausibly
cheating them. Therefore, if politician cares about reelection he would
be willing to push down pmt at least to 1/2. This is of course easier in a
society where people can easily be made fools, i.e. in one with a skewed
distribution of ηit. We summarize this result in Proposition 1:
16See Callender and Wilkie (2007) for a discussion on credible and cheap talkers politi-
cians.
17Straightforward computation shows that the logit function, Eit = log(1−λ) + log ηi+
PROPOSITION 1: Let pmt (λt, ηmt , q) ≡ P (σt = H|σˆmt = L;λt, ηmt ).
(i) If pmt (λt, ηmt , q) ≤ 12 the optimal strategy in the stage game is to play
ϕt = 1.
(ii) If pmt (λt, ηmt , q) >
1
2 the incumbent will not be retained (i.e. ϕt = 0).
2.2.4 Timing of events
The timing of events within every period is as follows:
T1 Nature draws σt = {H,L}, that is private information of the ruler.
Each citizen inherits eit from the private investment made at time
t − 1 and benefits from the public investment made by the former
government, Gt−1.
T2 Politician in office chooses the action λt, the congruence rate, and,
accordingly, invest in a public good (that will be productive in t+1),
i.e. chooses Gt = {0, 1}.
T3 Citizens plan to invest hit in human capital based on their beliefs on
the ruler’s type.
T4 Elections are held (the median citizen chooses ϕt = {0, 1} based on
posterior beliefs).
T5 Payoffs are given by rents and consumptions to politician and citi-
zens respectively.
2.3 The Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
2.3.1 The political agency problem and the definition of
equilibrium
The model features a typical agency problem where politicians in office
maximize private rents, expressed by (2.1). In every period t he must de-
cide whether to appear pleasant to voters and being reelected or not, by
log(q/1 − q), is an increasing function of ηi and q, whereas decreases with λ. Once again,
choosing which type of politician being (i.e. an admissible value of λt).
Behaving congruently, for a given distribution of education, raises the
chance of being reelected in the next period, but nothing says on political
choices that the incumbent will take on in the future. In fact, despite the
strong incentive the ruler has, any promises cannot be credible, since, in
every period t, the ruler has the chance of disregarding the announce-
ment made on Gt and nevertheless being reelected. This commitment
problem impedes politician to build a reputation over time18 and allows
us to solve the dynamic game using the Markov Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (MPBE) concept. The MPBE is defined as a set of Markovian
strategies which only depends on the current payoff-relevant states of
the economy, eit ∈ R+ ∪ {0}, σt ∈ Σ ≡ {L,H}, Gt−1 ∈ {0, 1}, and
ϕt−1 ∈ {0, 1}, and on prior actions within the same date, according to
the timing of events in 2.4, denoted by kt ∈ K; for every possible his-
tory, lt,k ∈ Lt,k, of the dynamic game up to time t and stage k of the
stage game of time t, such a strategies are best responses to each other.
The Markovian strategies are also optimal given beliefs, and beliefs are
updated using Bayes’ rule, according to (2.8).
More formally, for every q ∈ [0, 1] and for each value of the state
variable and each combination of prior moves in the stage game given
by K, a Markovian strategy mapping
s : [0, 1]× Σ× {0, 1}2 ×R+ ∪ {0} × K → [0, 1]×R+ ∪ {0} × {0, 1}
assigns a value for each of the actions: the congruence rate taken on by
the ruler, λt ∈ [0, 1], the amount of private investment made by each
citizen, hit ∈ R+∪{0}, and the decision of reelecting the incumbent, ϕt ∈
{0, 1}. We then proceed to determine the equilibrium within each period
by backward induction, given eit, σt, Gt−1, and ϕt−1 and the beliefs.
more educated people collect more evidence upon the job of politicians.
18The impossibility of building up a reputation roots with the seminal work by Barro
(1973) and it is a milestone of political agency models with no types differences. According
to that campaign promises are meaningless, given that lying is costless, and policies are
determined only once a candidate is installed in office.
Figure 2.4: Public investments subgame. Note that when the state is thought to be
weak every citizens know that the ruler will play Gt = GLLˆ = 0, no matter the
educational level of him. On the contrary, when the state is thought to be strong
public investments can be positive (GHHˆ = 1) or null (GHLˆ = 0) with probabilities
given respectively by equations (2.6) and (2.7).
2.3.2 Elections and political accountability
At the end of each period t, elections are held based on posterior beliefs
that each citizen i has. Elections predict that the incumbent will be re-
elected if the median of the education distribution guesses that he is not
cheating them. Reexpressing (2.10) we get the set of admissible strategies
for a policymaker who cares about reelection:
λt ≥ 1− 1
ηmt
(1− q
q
)
≡ λ∗t (ηmt , q) (2.11)
According to (2.11), the optimal strategy in the stage game of the ruler is,
if the public investment is not too costly, to play in time T2
max
[
0, λ∗t (η
m
t , q)
]
≤ λt ≤ 1 (2.12)
Note that the fact that λ∗t (ηmt , q) is increasing in ηmt strongly put into the
government’s business the issue of accountability. Finally, if q ≤ 1/2 the
inequality (2.11) is always true, for all λt (see Figure 2.16).
2.3.3 The accumulation process
We now engage with the accumulation process carried out by citizens
given the ruler’s strategy λt. In T3 citizens invest in human capital on
the basis of the informations they have in mind. Accordingly, no private
investments would be planned if the state is thought to be weak because
GLt ≈ 0 certainly and so will be the output tomorrow. Trivially, each cit-
izen i would carried out hit = 0 in any MPBE no matter the education
level he has and, in that case, the human capital stock would be firmly
the same than period t − 1 unless depreciation takes place at rate δ > 0.
On the other side, with probability q, the state is strong and public in-
vestments are thought to be viable; suddenly, each agent’s task becomes
to puzzle out whether the ruler is telling the truth or a lie (for an exempli-
fication of the cognitive process see Figure 3.1). Using (2.6) and (2.7), we
allow politicians to play the following mixed strategy in the stage game:
GHt =
{
1 with 1− (1− λt)ηit
0 with (1− λt)ηit
(2.13)
Thereby the current and the expected future individual output in stateH
will be
yit = G
γ
t−1(e
i
t)
α (2.14)
Et(yit+1) = q
[
1− (1− λt)ηit
]
(eit+1)
α (2.15)
Recursively, each citizen maximizes the expected current period return
that will be consumed according to (2.4) and the agent i’s intertemporal
utility at time t is
V (eit) = max
hit
{
(1− τ)yit −
1
φ
(hit)
φ + βq
[
Et
[
V H(eit+1)|σˆi = H
]
+
+ Et
[
V H(eit+1)|σˆi = L
]]
+ β(1− q)
[
Et
[
V L(eit+1)|σˆi = H
]
+ Et
[
V L(eit+1)|σˆi = L
]]} (2.16)
where income is given by (2.15) and (2.14) and private investments by
(2.2). Note that for any β > 0 each agent cares both in today and to-
morrow, and he would like to invest today for consuming tomorrow too.
Maximization19 gives the individual i’s optimal investment effort in each
19To get analytical results we drop the learning effect by setting investment costs to be
period t as a function of the state variable eit and the ruler congruence rate
λt:
PROPOSITION 2: Citizens optimally respond to politicians’ congruence rate
by lowering private investments when λt decreases. The reaction is as strong as
larger is the level of sophistication ηit:
hit(e
i
t;λt) = (1− δ)
[
Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit)
1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit)
]
eit (2.17)
with Ω(q) ≡ 2βq(1− τ) ≤ 120.
Consistently to the endogenous growth literature, Proposition 2 em-
phasizes the welfare enhancing role of public good provision and thereby
the importance to select perfect agents, who always choose λt = 1, to
rule public business. As soon as the congruence rate decreases, citizens
optimally respond by lowering private investment. However, despite
everyone faces the same technology (2.15), the extent of the reaction is
heterogeneous. In the appendix (where all the proofs are gathered) we
show how ∂2hit/∂λt∂ηit ≥ 0, meaning that more sophisticated citizens
react faster than naives. The former indeed collect all the information re-
quired to screen the ruler being aware of what is going on and therefore
would be willing to pay more for a given increase in the congruence rate
than the naive types.
Education helps them to be informed and sophisticated. However,
perhaps surprisingly, we found the effect of education on private invest-
ments to be hill-shaped conditional on the politician behavior. Naive
citizens always invest increasingly with the human capital stock eit no
matter the ruler’s strategy unless eit = 0 which forces unskilled agents
to not invest due to a liquidity constraint for missing credit markets.
As soon as more information is acquired, citizens start to be aware of
rulers’ moves dropping investments if something wrong is thought to
equal to (hit)
φ/φ. Furthermore, to simplify notations we will keep all the results as func-
tions of eit, dropping Gt−1, ϕt−1 and σt as arguments though both are state variables of
the economy.
be done21. Interestingly, as Figure 2.17 points out, the identified cutoff
e˜t(λt) is an increasing function of λt; as we showed more formally in
the appendix, a congruent political environment wipes out the implica-
tions of decreasing educational effect because, for λt → 1, e˜t converges
to e¯ making investments increasing in human capital for the most skilled
agents too. Institutions thus shape the agents’ attitudes of investing but
the most naive’s. The latter always invest more and more even though
a dishonest politician has been facing. In this sense the investment re-
action of the naive citizens is inelastic with respect to politics: e˜t(0) is
still positive so as investments are increasing for eit < e˜t(0). This is con-
sistent with a large literature dealing with political extractive institutions
and economic incentives in developing countries (e.g Acemoglu et al.,
2001, 2002, 2003; Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999), though
heterogeneity and naivete´ have never been investigated before.
Besides, complete comparative statics on the subgame equilibrium
has been investigated:
(a) First of all, depreciation δ discourages agents to invest more given
that much of it will be destroyed in future times (∂hit/∂δ ≤ 0).
Similarly taxation τ does, casting down the accumulation process
(∂hit/∂τ ≤ 0).
(b) On the other side, more optimistic agents clearly invest more (∂hit/∂q ≥
0) and evenly do the most patient ones (β → 1) in order to consume
more in the future.
Once the private optimal investment has been characterized, the law
of motion of education eit+1(eit;λt), for every citizen i, is easily yielded
by substituting (2.17) into (2.2):
eit+1(e
i
t;λt) =
1− δ
1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit)
eit (2.18)
21Although the absence of learning effects on the accumulation of education is unrealis-
tic, it has the merit to emphasize the drop effect (evenly unrealistically missing in other for-
mer models) which encourages more sophisticated citizens to not invest when politicians
State equation (2.18) is an increasing concave function which implies that
some mechanisms will lead all the citizens to a common steady state hu-
man capital level22.
2.3.4 The political process
In section 2.3.3 we have demonstrated how the accumulation process and
the wealth of a society depends on the institutions and on the extent to
which the ruler is willing to be congruent (both summarized by λ). We
now move on to consider the reverse interaction going through politi-
cal mechanisms: how do sophisticated voters bind politician’s attitude
to be dissonant. This amounts to endogenize political choices as a best
response of the sophistication rate of the electorate.
According to the timing of events depicted in section 2.2.4, in T2 the
ruler anticipates what is the level of private investments made by each
citizen i and chooses the optimal congruence rate λt = P (σˆ = H|σ = H)
ranged according to (2.12). If he is prone to be congruent to the an-
nouncement made in state H he will make the claimed investments.
Otherwise, he will not carry any public investment out. More generally,
we allow politicians to play the following mixed strategy in the stage
game23:
Gt =
{
1 with λt
0 with 1− λt
(2.19)
so that the MPBE is obtained by solving, according to equation (2.1), the
following recursive optimization problem:
max
λt
V rt (λt) = Tt − qBλt + βEt
[
V rt+1(λt)
]
s.t. (2.12) (2.20)
engage in per se rent seeking policies.
22As we have argued, this is a straight consequence of the absence of learning effect (see
footnote 21). Nevertheless, different common steady state human capital levels would be
easily obtained allowing citizens to have different priors. In this fashion, more optimistic
citizens (i.e. with qi higher) would get in equilibrium more.
23Note that in equation (2.13) the same mixed strategy has been described from the cit-
izens’ point of view whom know what is the level of λt according to his own level of so-
phistication. That makes up the guessed probability about whether politician are telling a
lie or the truth.
Therefore, political choices shape both current rents, Tt − qBλt, and the
income flow that is expected in t+1 from reelection. Since credit markets
are imperfect, the government cannot spend more than what has been
collected by taxing the electorate. It implies that the cost of the project
B ≤ Tt. In what follows, we just express B as a fraction b ∈ [0, 1] of
the current tax revenues, i.e. B = bTt, which in turn are equal to Tt =
τyt, that involve aggregated outcome level yt =
∫ 1
0
yitdi. To keep things
easy, in line with Glomm and Ravikumar (1992) and Benabou (1996, 2000,
2002), we suppose education to be initially distributed as a log-normal
random variable with mean µ0 and variance ∆20, i.e. ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20).
However, it is easy to note from (2.18) that the distribution of eit, which
is endogenous, remains log-normally distributed over time with mean
µt and variance ∆2t . It follows from (2.14) that also income remains log-
normally distributed over time with mean mt = 2µt + ∆2t , i.e. ln yit ∼
N (2µt + ∆2t , v2t ).
At the same way, from (2.18) we obtain the difference equation which
governs the evolution of the economy, i.e. the law of motion of the ag-
gregate level of human capital:
µt+1 = µt + ∆
2
t/2 + (Ω− δ)− Ω(1− λt)ηt (2.21)
for small values of Ω(1−λt)ηt and with ηt ≡ exp(µt+∆2t/2)/e¯. Substitut-
ing (2.21) into (2.15) yields the expected output in t+ 1 of the economy:
mt+1 = mt + 2(Ω− δ)− (1 + 2Ω)(1− λt)ηt (2.22)
The first two terms describe, respectively, the positive effect of the initial
condition of the economy and of exogenous parameters that feature pref-
erences (β), beliefs (q), policies (−τ ), and the obsoleteness of the capital
stock (−δ). The social cost of cheating, in terms of future income loss,
is instead showed in the last term. In particular, equation (2.22) makes
clear how dissonant politicians, that always play low values of λt, are
detrimental to citizens reducing future wealth. Interestingly, the social
cost increases with Ω and µt by pushing politicians’ incentive to draw
more rents.
The incumbent’s expected rents from being reelected are then equal
to:
lnV rt (λt) = max
λt
{
ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t − qbλt + βEt
[
lnV rt+1(λt)
]}
s.t. (2.12)
(2.23)
Maximizing rents amounts to choice an optimal rate of congruence λt,
ranged according to (2.12). By doing that the incumbent trades off future
tax revenues with current rents coming from smaller public investment.
Due to the functional form of rents, it is easy to note that ∂ lnV rt /∂λt ≤ 0
iff
b ≥ β(1 + 2Ω)ηt
q
≡ b(β, q, τ, ηt) (2.24)
with ηt ≡ exp(µt + ∆2t/2)/e¯. In other words, rents are found to be de-
creasing with his congruence rate provided that the cost of the public
investment, relative to tax revenues, is high enough. Interestingly, the
threshold b is found to be increasing with β, q, and −τ , meaning that
better economic conditions reduce the incumbent’s incentives to behave
dissonantly. So does a more sophisticated electorate. When condition
(2.24) holds, incumbent rulers maximize office rents by pushing down
λt as much as they can. However, given the accountability effort ex-
erted by voters, the lowest still optimal value is the maximum between
λ∗t = 1 − 1/ηmt ((1 − q)/q) and zero, according to (2.12). We summarize
this result in Proposition 3:
PROPOSITION 3: Political equilibrium. Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20).
There exists b and b¯(ηmt ), decreasing in ηmt , with 0 ≤ b ≤ b¯(ηmt ) ≤ 1, such
that:
(i) If b < b the incumbent plays λt = 1 and the median voter plays ϕt = 1.
(ii) If b ∈ [b, b¯(δ)] the incumbent plays λt = λ∗t (ηmt ) and the median voter
plays ϕt = 1.
(iii) If b > b¯(δ) the incumbent plays λt = 0 and the median voter plays ϕt = 0
(Go-for-Broke).
When public investments are costly enough it is optimal for rents-
maximizing policymakers to set the rate of congruence λt to be the low-
est possible value. However, due to accountability effort, the optimal
congruence rate is:
λ∗t = 1−
1
ηmt
(1− q
q
)
(2.25)
that is increasing both in q and in the overall society’s level of sophisti-
cation. In particular, it is worth to note that for every ηmt ≤ (1 − q)/q
the optimal strategy in the stage game for the incumbent is to be fully
dissonant (i.e. λ∗t = 0).
The cost of the public good drives political decisions for a given dis-
tribution of education in the society. When b is very small (i.e. b < b)
there is no incentive to cheat the electorate because investing increases
future rents more than what he would have obtained today by choosing
Gt = 0. However, the cost of the project, while feasible (i.e. b ≤ 1), could
be so high to incentive the ruler to go-for-broke. If b > b¯ playing go-for-
broke by extracting all the tax revenues strictly dominates λt = λ∗t (and a
fortiori any λt > λ∗t ). The median voter anticipates that for every b > b¯ the
incumbent behaves dissonantly (i.e. λt < λ∗t ) assigning probability zero
on the event that the ruler plays a congruent rate greater than λ∗t . Conse-
quently, the median voter plays ϕt = 0 and the ruler, that anticipates this
move, goes-for-broke.
In the Appendix we also show that b¯(δ) is a decreasing function of
the depreciation rate of the human capital of the producers so as for high
level of δ Go-for-Broke is more likely to be the optimal strategy in the
stage game. In particular, there exists a threshold δ∗ such that for any
δ < δ∗ Going-for-Broke is not an admissible strategy for the ruler, i.e.
b¯(δ) > 1.
In what follows we only consider the most interesting case of b ∈
[b, b¯(δ)].
2.3.5 The characterization of the MPBE
Once λt, and then Gt, are realized citizens come to know what is their
pay-off, that is how much they have really invested and what is their
production and what will be their human capital level in next periods.
Figure 2.5: Political Equilibrium as a function of b.
This comes out by substituting (2.25) into (2.17) and (2.18) respectively:
hit(e
i
t; q, e
m
t ) = (1− δ)
[
Ω(1− eitemt
1−q
q )
1− Ω(1− eitemt
1−q
q )
]
eit (2.26)
eit+1(e
i
t; q, e
m
t ) =
1− δ
1− Ω(1− eitemt
1−q
q )
eit (2.27)
All the MPBE values not only depend on the own level of education but
also on the general level of sophistication of the society, emt . This posi-
tive external effect works through the accountability effort pushed by the
median citizen, that makes more likely a fair political environment with
higher investment returns. This is in line with what Bidner and Francois
(2013) defines dynamic complementarity between the willingness to vote
out today’s transgressing leader with a higher expectation that citizens
will vote out future transgressors. In our model, dynamic complemen-
tarity among voters intertemporal strategies naturally emerge: sophis-
ticated societies force indeed rulers to invest more making them more
sophisticated in the future.
Beliefs also play a crucial role, and they are updated according to
(2.8); in particular, a strong belief in favor of state L will bring citizens
to not carry any investment out. Combining the two effects shows that
agents are willing to produce and invest iff eit ≤ (q/1− q)emt , that is very
likely to occur for high values of q (for q → 1 the right hand side diverges
to +∞ but a q = 0 leads agents to inactivity) and emt .
Therefore we characterize the MBP equilibrium in Proposition 4:
PROPOSITION 4: Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20), there exists a unique Markov
Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium such that
(i) If the state is weak (σt = L) the incumbent ruler does not carry out any
public investment (Gt = 0). Citizens know that and respond by not
investing (hit = 0) regardless of the education they have and by retaining
the incumbent (ϕt = 1); future stocks of human capital are only driven
by past level and depreciation (i.e. eit+1 = (1− δ)eit).
(ii) If the state is strong (σt = H) and if the cost of the public good is suffi-
ciently high, the incumbent ruler has the incentive to cheat citizens that in
turn bind politicians by accountability. The ruler cares to be reappointed
and the optimal strategy is given by (2.25) when condition (2.24) holds
so as citizens relect him (ϕt = 1). Citizens, on the other side, guess the
ruler does not invest (Gt = 0) with probability (1−λt)ηit and respond by
investing and accumulating according to (2.26) and (2.27), respectively.
2.3.6 Equilibrium payoffs and concerns for inequality
State H is the most interesting one, conveying all the insights here pre-
sented. Given the optimal strategies, in equilibrium, payoffs are given
by future income and rents to citizens and politicians, that in state H are
respectively:
mt+1 = 2µt + ∆
2
t + 2(Ω− δ)− (1 + 2Ω)
1− q
q
exp
(
∆2t
2
)
(2.28)
Vrt ≡ lnV rt = (1 + β) ln τ + 2(1 + β)µt + (1 + β)∆2t − qb+ b(1− q)
1
ηmt
+ β ln q + 2β(Ω− δ)− β(1 + 2Ω)(1− q) exp
(
∆2t
2
)
(2.29)
where (2.28) stands for the average producer. Note that both citizens’
and ruler’s payoffs depend on peculiar features of the distribution of
human capital, ln(et/emt ) = ∆2t/2. In particular, ∆2t describes the extent
to which the wealth is unequally distributed among different citizens
and, limited to the case of the log-normal distribution, it increases with
the mean but declines with the median level of education owned by the
political pivotal citizen.
The global effect of inequality on both income and rents turns to be
non linear and hill-shaped, meaning that little inequality is tolerated by
citizens24. The levels of inequality tolerated by citizens, however, are
smaller than those preferred by politicians and higher levels hit oppos-
ingly citizens and politicians, and only the latter benefit for that. The
idea is illustrated in Figure 4, where ∆¯c and ∆¯r are respectively the bliss
points of citizens and rulers, with ∆¯c < ∆¯r. We collect these results in
Proposition 5 established in the Appendix:
PROPOSITION 5: Let ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20), there exists ∆¯c and ∆¯r with
0 < ∆¯c < ∆¯r, such that:
(i) for each ∆2t ∈ [∆¯c, ∆¯r] future income declines with inequality ∆2t such
that, given the accountability effort, citizens, on average, worst off. Con-
versely, inequality increases ruler’s rents, manipulating poor and extract-
ing rents from taxes of the wealthiest.
(ii) for ∆2t < ∆¯c (∆2t > ∆¯r) both citizens and politicians better (worst) off
with inequality.
The role of inequality can be easily interpreted into our framework.
Positive skewed and unequal (right-tailed) distributions characterize so-
cieties with most naive agents and scarcely sophisticated citizens. Naive
24This is consistent with the unified theory of inequality and growth proposed by Ga-
lor and Moav (2006) who describe a non-linear hill-shaped relationship story. A low-level
of inequality enhanced the process of development, mainly driven by physical capital,
by channeling resources toward individuals whose marginal propensity to save is higher.
In later stages of development, human capital turns to be the main engine of economic
growth, and, in the presence of credit constraint, a more equal distribution of income stim-
ulate investment in human capital and promoted economic growth. See also Galor (2011)
and Galor and Zeira (1993).
Figure 2.6: Heterogeneous effects of inequality upon future income and politician
rents.
agents always invest in human capital and vote for incumbents what-
ever the latter do. Sophisticated agents, conversely, invest more but un-
der the condition that the incumbent invest too. In this case, they do
not reappoint the incumbent either. Because of the positive externalities
generated, via accountability, by the median voter, citizens give a posi-
tive weight to the median and henceforth to equality, on the region on
the right of ∆¯c, contributing to explain why people dislike living in a so-
ciety which is too unequal, beside altruism, or aversion to social tension,
crime, or civil wars. Pushing down the median value of the distribution
instead permits the ruler being more independent from the electorate
control. That explains why inequality, on the region on the left of ∆¯r, is
strictly preferred by the rulers. On the other hand, citizens’ production is
required to bring up tax revenues that, in turns, mainly constitute rents.
Too unequal societies, like most developing countries, fail in accumulate
human capital that mainly constitutes tax revenues, explaining why rents
are hill-shaped with respect to inequality. The interesting social conflict
that characterizes well-functioning democracies, with intermediate in-
equality (i.e. ∆2t ∈ [∆¯c, ∆¯r]), is resolved when inequality is too low or
high, and only in the former case it is found to be socially enhancing,
since either the median is already high to avoid electorate manipulation
or the mean is low, such that more accumulation is wished for.
2.4 Dynamics and multiple steady states
The initial distribution of human capital strongly shapes the dynamics of
the economy, political choices, and agents’ incentives. Right tailed dis-
tributions are mostly composed by naive agents who invest a small but
positive amount in human capital and, at the same time, barely account
for ruler’s duties that, in turn, are allowed to extradraw private rents (by
playing small values of λt). Conversely, we found that rulers are con-
strained by more sophisticated societies that impose high values of λt as
the price for reappointment.
The model thus predicts multiple steady-states, one for sophisticated
societies with congruent politicians in charge and one for naive societies
ruled by dissonant politicians, and we found the median agent to be piv-
otal in determining the dynamics of the whole society. To demonstrate
that we need to solve the following recursive dynamical system which
describes the joint evolution of education and policy:{
eit+1 = χ(e
i
t;λt, e
m
t )
λt = Λ(e
m
t )
(2.30)
The solution, at the intersection of the two loci, gives us the long-run
human capital level of equilibrium:
e∞ =
(
1− δ
Ω
)(
q
1− q
)
em∞ (2.31)
where, by equation (2.18), em∞ is a function of the initial condition em0 ,
that is em∞(em0 ). The model thus predicts convergence of all agents (but
the unskilled ones) to a common educational value, that increases with
the median and the prior q. All the parameters that compose Ω, β, q, and
(1−τ), contribute to push up e∞, whereas it decreases with depreciation.
That means that initially less skewed societies, i.e. with higher em0 , will
be more educated and richer in the long run (see Figure 2.19).
However, as illustrated in Figure 2.19, two societies with the same
initial conditions, and in particular with the same initial distribution of
education at time t = 0, can nonetheless be driven toward two different
steady-states. A consistent raise in depreciation or taxation can in fact
undermine the effect of optimism (q) and faith in the future (β) persis-
tently discouraging agents to invest to push down society to a zero-level
educational state.
The role of the median is then pivotal in that. We show that if q <
q¯(β, δ, τ) the median agent takes a decreasing trajectory and the rest of
the society will do the same, firstly the more sophisticated agents and, at
last, the naive ones25. In fact, if the median decreases over time makes
easy the politician to push down λ, that in turn discourage private agents
to carry out any investments (see Figure 2.19). More general results are
collected in Proposition 6:
PROPOSITION 6: When citizens are pessimists enough, i.e. if q < q¯(β, δ, τ),
(or equivalently when the depreciation rate is above a critical value δ¯(β, q, τ)),
society converges to a zero-level of education, no matter initial conditions. Con-
versely, if q = q¯(β, δ, τ) multiple stable steady-states arise (e∞ = em0 ), and
rulers are more congruent in societies with higher initial educational achieve-
ments. Finally, if q > q¯(β, δ, τ) society gets richer over time and the speed of
the human capital growth is determined by the initial distribution of education.
Where multiple steady-states occur, history matters (Be´nabou, 2000).
Temporary shocks to the distribution of human capital (such as immigra-
tion, educational discrimination, shifts in demand or technology) as well
as to the political system (slavery, voting-rights restrictions) can perma-
nently move society from one equilibrium to the other, or more generally
have long-lasting effects on the economy.
2.5 Endogenous fiscal choices
In a framework a´ la Ferejhon (1986) the only instrument that citizens/voters
have to punish a bad politician is to vote him out by replacing him with
a challenger. Voters decide a political platform or a politician that once
in office decide which level of taxation applies. Alternatively, one may
think of the tax rate to remain constant over time whoever the politician
in power. Redistribution might change only slightly over time whereas
25It turns out that q¯(β, δ, τ) is a U-shaped function of β, bell-shaped in τ and linearly
increasing in δ. A society is then less likely to be pushed down to e∞ = 0 for high values
of β, small taxes and depreciation.
the willingness to cheat the electorate might change dramatically with a
change in office.
We now extend the model to allow agents to decide the optimal fiscal
rate, that so far has been held exogenous. Fiscal choices are trivial in
state σt = L and the most preferred rate is τ = 0. Conversely, in state
H redistribution is gladly accepted and necessary to provide investment
Gt in a productive public good. We then assume that before the ruler
announces his decision to carry out any public investment in time T2,
citizens are called to decide the most preferred level of redistribution, τ∗.
All the other timing is unchanged.
The individual optimal tax rate is obtaining by solving the MPBE by
backward induction. Each citizen i, endowed with eit in time t, antici-
pates which is the optimal congruence rate of the ruler, λ∗t , and accord-
ingly solve the following quadratic maximization problem, obtained by
substituting (2.25), (2.27), and (2.26) into (2.16):
V∗(τ) = max
τ
{
(1− τ)(eit)2 −
1
2
(hit)
∗(τ |λ∗t )
+ βq[Et[V H((eit+1)∗(τ |λ∗t ))|σˆi = H]]
}
.
(2.32)
To get analytical results we constrain parameters to have the follow-
ing values26: q = 0.25, β = 1, and δ = 0. Such restriction describes
a pessimistic scenario where despite human capital does not depreciate
over time and citizens give the greatest importance and weight to future
payoffs, the state H is really unlikely to occur. In such scenario, only
naive citizens would claim more taxes for doing the public project. The
rest of them, and in particular citizens with eit ≥ (1/3)emt , would like to
not contribute to a project that they anticipate will never be done. Figure
2.7(a) shows this scenario.
However, as we pointed out in Section 2.3.4, the optimal congruence
rate λ∗t (q) increases with q. Sophisticated citizens anticipate that and,
accordingly, choose the optimal tax rate that increases with q. In Fig-
ure 2.7(b) the optimal taxation is depicted for q = 0.75 as a function of
the individual relative level of sophistication. Though naive citizens still
26All the algebra is gathered in the Appendix.
Figure 2.7: Optimal taxation as a function of political sophistication. We set pa-
rameters β = 1 and δ = 0. In panel (a), a pessimistic scenario is depicted with
q = 1/4. Here, only naive citizens with eit ≤ (1/3)emt would be glad to con-
tribute to a public project that is unlikely to be done. τ∗ is not a maximum for
eit ∈ ((1/3)emt , (9/10)emt ), but a corner solution has been characterized in the Ap-
pendix where these citizens always claim for τ∗ = 0. Finally, in panel (b) a more
optimistic scenario is depicted with q = 3/4 and accordingly more sophisticated citi-
zens are more inclined to participate to the public project.
would like to contribute at a higher rate to the public project, sophisti-
cated ones anticipate that the politician in office might be a congruent
type and therefore increase τ∗ with respect to the former case. Finally,
when q = 1 all the citizens, regardless the own relative individual level
of sophistication, vote for the highest contribution to the project.
We collect this result in Proposition 7:
PROPOSITION 7: Citizens punish politicians by choosing the optimal con-
tribution rate τ∗ according to their own relative individual level of sophistica-
tion eit/emt . When they expect politicians to cheat they react by lowering the
contribution rate, provided they are sophisticated enough.
2.6 Conclusions
The paper discusses the importance of education for the success of democ-
racy, as a cognitive tool that citizens/voters can use to decode the infor-
mation content of political signal and to keep rulers in charge account-
able. Remarkably, productivity and citizens welfare may increase with
education, via sophisticated electoral accountability, even if education
has no direct effect on productivity, via human capital accumulation.
This second nexus, tough realistic, is not necessary for the paper story
but it only strengthen the results by defining virtuous or wicked polit-
ical paths, depending on the initial distribution of sophistication in the
society.
Aside from the intensity and significance of the political competition
and the likelihood of alternation in office, much of the political science
literature has pointed out that the most important elements constitut-
ing a democracy are the degree of information and participation of the
citizens and the structures of accountability characterizing the political
sphere. This paper arguably shows that rent maximizer politicians rule
congruently public businesses when a sophisticated electorate account
for it and behave dissonantly when they are allowed to. Naive voters
are basically unaware of the politicians intentions providing to the latter
opportunities for the manipulation of the economy. However, as far as
sophisticated citizens are the majority, manipulation would be hard to be
carried out.
The initial level (condition) of sophistication is striking for the success
of a young democracy. More educated societies are more able to punish
politicians that, in turn, invest more in infrastructure, roads or legal rules
for contracts enforcement. These productive public goods foster private
investment in education (or human capital) making future accountability
more effective. Such a desirable cycle may fail to start in young democ-
racy when voters are (on a median level) poorly educated, giving rooms
to rent-maximizer politicians to cheat them. The combination of the ac-
cumulation and political mechanism creates the potential for multiple
steady states, one for low-education societies with dissonant rulers and
one for high-education societies with congruent rulers.
Promising future works is expected from this preliminary investiga-
tion of the behavioral mechanism of political economy. The model is in-
deed general enough to allow several extensions. One of them consider
the incentive structure of populist politicians to promise public invest-
ments, for electoral purposes, even though there is no room for invest-
ing. On the other side, this framework may contribute to explain why
the introduction of term-limits is not fully compatible with rules incen-
tives to pocket public money by investing less. In naive societies, in fact,
a longer carrier horizon might not be sufficient to induce rulers to behave
congruently.
2.7 Supporting Details
2.7.1 Evolution of beliefs upon the state of the world
Let ξ = P (σt+1|σt) the persistence rate of the Markov process. From Fig.
2.8 follows that
qt+1 = P (σt+1 = H) = ξqt + (1− ξ)(1− qt).
The evolution of beliefs upon the state of the world therefore depends
on ξ (see Fig. 2.9) for a given level of qt. One may see that ξ = 1 gener-
ates a Bernoulli scheme that is a process characterized by fully persistent
beliefs, i.e. P (σt+1) = P (σt). For ξ = 0.5 the process is a random walk
where future beliefs upon the state of the world are independent from
past beliefs but for ξ = 0 citizens behave fully irrationally guessing that
the state of the world changes time by time. Henceforth, for ξ < 0.5 the
process is behavioral whereas for ξ = 0.5 citizens are totally incapable
to make any prediction given qt27. To keep things easy we allow ξ = 1
throughout all the paper so as qt+1 = qt = q.
27That may be a good model for society characterized by high uncertain about future
state of the world.
Figure 2.8: Inferential process upon the state of the world .
Figure 2.9: Law of motion of qt+1(qt) for different values of ξ .
2.7.2 Asymptotic features of eit+1(eit, λ) taking λ as given
Here, we show that the interaction between naivete´ and institution acts
as a centripetal force with respect to the accumulation process through
time leading to a degenerate ergodic distribution in the steady-state. Un-
der several economic conditions and beliefs, the equilibrium is insensi-
tive to political choices and, regardless of sophistication, all citizens get a
zero-level of human capital. When q is high enough, conversely, the long
run human capital level is positive and increasing in the ruler’s congru-
ence rate. We summarize the asymptotic features of (2.18) in Proposition
8, followed by an intuitive proof and discussion. The formal proof is
collected in the Appendix.
PROPOSITION 8: Let Ω(q) ≤ 1.
(i) If q is sufficiently small (δ ≥ Ω(q)), society converges to a zero-level of
education (e∞ = 0), regardless of the initial human capital stock and
political choices.
(ii) If q is sufficiently high (Ω(q) ≥ δ), society (but the unskilled) converges
to the following positive level of education
e∞(λ∞) =
Ω− δ
Ω(1− λ∞) e¯ (2.33)
that is increasing in λ∞. The unskilled citizens (with ei0 = 0) are stuck
in e∞ = 0 (unstable steady-state) due to a liquidity constraint.
The dynamical interaction between education and institutions under-
lines an ergodic process where agents can deviate at most temporarily
from a common steady-state level of education. λ operates as a cen-
tripetal force on the distribution and at last all the skilled agents will
have either e∞ = 0, if state L is very likely to occur, or e∞(λ∞) > 0,
when citizens are optimistic enough. This process has an economic in-
tuition in the latter case. According to his own level of sophistication,
each citizen i has an inverse individual measure of dissonance tolerance
(IDTM), λ˜it(ηit) – increasing in ηit – such that28
∂eit+1/∂e
i
t ≥ 1 iff λt ≥ λ˜it(ηit)
The statement above tells that only citizens with an IDTM sufficiently
small are willing to invest more in the future, that is very likely for naive
agents that in turn invest more and more getting more educated (see
Figure 2.18). Sophisticated citizens, on the other side, require a congru-
ent political environment to accumulate human capital (λt must be high
enough). In absence of it they know that much of the investment made
will be pocketed by the ruler such that investing more is not optimal till
28The extended functional form of λ˜it(η
i
t) is gathered in Appendix.
λ˜it+j(η
i
t+j) ≤ λt+j for j > 0. At last, all the citizens but the unskilled
catch up the steady-state e∞(λ∞).
The result collected in Proposition 2 is consistent to the literature that
investigates the theoretical nexus between economic growth and devel-
opment that emphasizes the role of institutions. In particular, this is re-
lated to Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) that identify economic
institutions as a fundamental cause of cross-country differences in pros-
perity29. According to that we introduce Corollary 1 that states that soci-
eties with better political institutions, in equilibrium, economically per-
form better:
COROLLARY 1: Let δ ≤ Ω(q) ≤ 1. Societies with fully congruent rulers
(λ∞ → 1) get the possible highest level of wealth e∞ → e¯. Societies with fully
dissonant rulers (λ∞ = 0) get the lowest level of wealth e∞ = (1− δ/Ω)e¯.
2.8 Proofs
2.8.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Claim 1: there exists a unique optimal level of private investment as a function
of the own level of education and the congruence rate of the ruler.
Proof: The first order condition of maximization (2.16) is
(hit)
φ−1 = βqV ′(eit+1)
that equals the costs of investing one unit more today, on the left hand
side, to the expected marginal benefits from getting more educated in the
future, on the right hand side: these are namely an increasing in future
output and the catch up of higher political sophistication. The solution of
the FOC uses the standard envelope condition to compute the expected
29Interestingly, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2005) also argue how institutions are
endogenous to political power of different social classes that struggle to each other for rul-
ing and having the biggest part of the pie. In the next subsection we endogeneize political
institutions through sophisticated accountability.
future marginal benefits:
V ′t+1 = α(1− τH)(1− (1− λt)ηit)(eit+1)α−1
Hence, we are left with
(hit)
φ−1 = αβq(1− τH)(1− (1− λt)ηit)(eit+1)α−1
To get an analytical solution we constrain the human capital elasticity
α = 2 and investment costs to be quadratic (i.e. φ = 2). This yields
equation (2.17). To prove that solution (2.17) is also unique we compute
the second order condition that is satisfied iff
1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit) ≥ 0
Since (1 − (1 − λt)ηit) ≤ 1, a sufficient condition for the SOC to hold is
that Ω ≡ 2βq(1− τH) ≤ 1.
Claim 2: Citizens optimally respond to politicians’ congruence rate by low-
ering private investments when λt decreases.
Proof: To prove that, we need to demonstrate that ∂hit/∂λt ≥ 0. Let
us define A ≡ Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit). Differentiation of (2.17) yields:
∂hit
∂λt
=
(1− δ)eit
1−A
∂A
∂λt
+
(1− δ)Aeit
(1−A)2
∂A
∂λt
=
(1− δ)eit
1−A
∂A
∂λt
(
1 +
A
1−A
)
≥ 0
Claim 3: The reaction is as strong as larger is the level of sophistication ηit
(Spence-Mirlees condition).
Proof: The statement requires that ∂2hit/∂λt∂eit ≥ 0. Straight differ-
entiation yields:
∂2hit
∂λt∂eit
=
1− δ
1−A
[
2− Ω(1− λt)η
i
t
1−A
]
∂A
∂λt
≥ 0
iff 2(1−A) ≥ Ω(1− λt)ηit. Rearranging we get
(1− Ω) + (1−A) ≥ 0
where both the addends are positive by SOC.
Claim 4: Private investment are hill-shaped with respect to human capital
stock conditional on the political environment.
Proof: Straight differentiation shows that ∂hit/∂eit ≥ 0 iff
3Ω(1− λt)2(ηit)2 − 2(1− Ω)(1− λ)ηit + (1− Ω) ≥ 0
Solving with respect to eit yields a cut-off value, e˜t(λt), according to that
two different patterns of propensity to invest have been found:
• ∀ eit ∈ [0, e˜t(λt)] =⇒ ∂h
i
t
∂eit
≥ 0
• ∀ eit ∈ [e˜t(λt), e¯] =⇒ ∂h
i
t
∂eit
≤ 0
Note that the identified cut-off
e˜t(λt) =
1
3
e¯
Ω(1− λt) (1− Ω)
1/2
[
(1− Ω)1/2 + (1− 4Ω)1/2]
is increasing to the congruence rate of the ruler, meaning that a fair po-
litical environment wipes out the implications of decreasing educational
effect because, for λt → 1, e˜t converges to e¯ making investments increas-
ing in human capital for the most skilled agents too. Finally, note that
e˜t(0) is still positive and increasing for eit < e˜t(0), i.e. even with a disso-
nant politician naive citizens still go through private investment.
2.8.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20). To show that eit keeps distributing lognor-
mally over time let us call
ξi0 = 1− Ω(1− (1− λ0)ηi0)
= (1− Ω) + (Ω(1− λ0)/e¯)ei0
Since ei0 distribute lognormally, with mean µ0 and variance ∆20, and the
other terms in ξi0 are constants, ξi0 must distribute lognormally as well
with mean µ0 + ln Ω + ln(1 − λ0) − ln e¯ + (1 − Ω) and variance ∆20. Fi-
nally, note that the sum of log-normal distributions yields, under certain
conditions, another lognormal distribution.
If ln eit ∼ N (µt,∆2t ) then yit = (eit)2 is a transformation of eit and must
distribute as a lognormal too: ln yit ∼ N (mt, v2t ), with mt = 2µt + ∆2t .
The law of motion of aggregated level of human capital is obtained
from (2.18). Taking a logarithmic transformation in both sides we are left
with
ln eit+1 = ln e
i
t + ln(1− δ)− ln(1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηt))
≈ ln eit − δ + Ω− Ω(1− λt)ηt
for small values of δ and Ω(1− λt)ηt. Averaging yields:
µt+1 = µt +
∆2t
2
+ (Ω− δ)− Ω(1− λt)ηt,
with ηt ≡ exp(µt + ∆2t/2)/e¯.
At the same way, we can compute the expected output in t+ 1 of the
economy; taking a logarithmic transformation of (2.15) yields:
ln yit+1 = 2 ln e
i
t+1 + ln(1− (1− λt)ηt) + ln(q)
≈ 2 ln eit+1 − (1− λt)ηt + ln(q)
Taking the average:
mt+1 = 2µt+1 − (1− λt)ηt
= 2µt + ∆
2
t + 2(Ω− δ)− 2Ω(1− λt)ηt − (1− λt)ηt
= mt + 2(Ω− δ)− (1 + 2Ω)(1− λt)ηt
In time T2 the incumbent ruler faces the following maximization prob-
lem:
V rt (λt) = max
λt
{
τyt − qbτytλt + βEt
[
V rt+1(λt)
]}
s.t. (2.12)
Taking a logarithmic transformation yields:
lnV rt (λt) = max
λt
{
ln τ + ln yt + ln(1− qbλt) + βEt
[
lnV rt+1(λt)
]}
s.t. (2.12)
≈ max
λt
{
ln τ + ln yt − qbλt + βEt
[
lnV rt+1(λt)
]}
s.t. (2.12)
= max
λt
{
ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t − qbλt + βEt
[
lnV rt+1(λt)
]}
s.t. (2.12)
where
Et
[
lnV rt+1(λt)
]
= ln q + ln τ +mt+1
= ln q + ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t + 2(Ω− δ)
− 2Ω(1− λt)ηt − (1− λt)ηt
Since the program is linear in λt, it is easy to note that
∂ lnV rt
∂λt
= β(1 + 2Ω)ηt − qb
that is negative if and only if condition (2.24) is satisfied, that is if the cost
of the public investment, relative to tax revenues, is high enough.
We now show that there exists a cutpoint-cost of the public good b¯
such that for every b > b¯ the ruler strictly prefer to going-for-broke in-
stead of playing a strategy λt ≥ λ∗t . We first show that, at time T2, the
value function of going-for-broke is strictly greater than the value taken
by being congruent enough (we show it for λt = λ∗t ; a fortiori it hold for
any λt > λ∗t ). Let us call Vrt ≡ lnV rt (λ∗t ).
Vrt < Tt
ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t > (1 + β) ln τ + 2(1 + β)µt + (1 + β)∆
2
t − qb+ b(1− q)
1
ηmt
+
+ β ln q + 2β(Ω− δ)− β(1 + 2Ω)(1− q) exp
(
∆2t
2
)
Solving by b yields b¯:
b¯(δ) ≡ β
[
ln τq +mt + 2β(Ω− δ)− β(1 + 2Ω)(1− q) exp
(∆2t
2
)]
q − (1− q) 1ηmt
.
Note that b¯(δ) is a decreasing function of the depreciation rate of the hu-
man capital of the producers so as for high level of δ Go-for-Broke is
more likely to be the optimal strategy in the stage game. In particular,
there exists a threshold δ∗ such that for any δ < δ∗ Going-for-Broke is not
an admissible strategy for the ruler. To show that we need to solve the
following inequality:
b¯(δ) > 1,
that holds for
δ < Ω− 1
2β
[
q − (1− q) 1
ηmt
− β ln τq + βmt − β(1 + 2Ω)(1− q) exp
(∆2t
2
)]
≡ δ∗
2.8.3 Proof of Proposition 5
Assume ln eit ∼ N (µt,∆2t ), such that ln(et/emt ) = ∆2t/2. Given condition
(2.24), the optimal congruence rate is
λ∗t = 1−
1− q
q
1
ηmt
.
Substituting it into the average future income mt+1 and the ruler’s rent
V rt yields equations (2.28) and (2.29), respectively.
Claim 1: Income is hill-shaped with respect to inequality.
Proof: Straight differentiation shows that income is increasing w.r.t.
inequality iff:
∂mt+1
∂∆2t
≥ 0⇐⇒ 1 ≥
(
1
2
+ Ω
)(
1− q
q
)
exp
(
∆2t
2
)
⇐⇒ ∆2t ≤ 2 ln(q)− 2 ln(1− q) + 2 ln(2)− 2 ln(1 + 2Ω) ≡ ∆¯c
Claim 2: Politicians rents are hill-shaped with respect to inequality.
Proof:
Straight differentiation shows that politicians rents are increasing w.r.t.
inequality iff:
∂ lnV rt
∂∆2t
≥ 0⇐⇒ 1 + β
β
≥ 1
2
(1 + 2Ω)
1− q
q
exp
(
∆2t
2
)
⇐⇒ ∆2t ≤ 2 ln 2+2 ln(1+β)−2 lnβ+2 ln q−2 ln(1−q)−2 ln(1+2Ω) ≡ ∆¯r
Claim 3: Citizens bliss point is smaller than ruler’s.
Proof: We need to demonstrate that ∆¯c < ∆¯r. It comes out from the
definitions in Claim 1 and 2:
∆¯c < ∆¯r ⇐⇒ ln(1 + β) > lnβ
that is always true.
2.8.4 Proof of Proposition 6
A stable steady state is a point (e∞, λ∞) with the curve χ(λ) cuts the
curve Λ(e) from above. An unstable steady state corresponds in each
case to an intersection from below.
The dynamical system (2.27) reduces to a one-dimensional recursion:
eit+1 = χ(e
i
t,Λ(e
i
t)). It has the following features:
(i)
χ(0) = 0
(ii)
χ′(eit) =
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Ω
(
1− eitemt
1−q
q
)]2 ≥ 0 by SOC
(iii)
χ′′(eit) = −
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Ω
(
1− eitemt
1−q
q
)]3 Ωemt 1− qq ≤ 0 by SOC
(iv)
χ′(eit) ≥ 1⇐⇒
e
i
t ∈
[
0, q1−q
emt
Ω (1− Ω)1/2
(
(1− δ)1/2 − (1− Ω)1/2
)]
iff Ω ≥ δ
eit ∈
[
q
1−q
emt
Ω (1− Ω)1/2
(
(1− δ)1/2 − (1− Ω)1/2
)
, 0
]
elsewhere
(v)
eit+1 = e
i
t = e∞
in four fixed points:
e(1)∞ = 0
e(2)∞ =

(
1− δΩ
)(
q
1−q
)
em∞ ≥ 0 iff Ω ≥ δ(
1− δΩ
)(
q
1−q
)
em∞ ≤ 0 elsewhere
A fixed point e∞ is stable if and only if
dχ(e)
de
∣∣∣
e=e∞
< 1
Computation tells us that e(2)∞ is the only stable fixed point if Ω(q) ≥ δ
(or if q ≥ q¯(β, δ, τ) ≡ 12 δβ(1−τ) ), whereas e(1)∞ = 0 is unstable. In the latter
case (Ω(q) ≤ δ), e(1)∞ = 0 is the unique stable fixed point.
In the former case, e(2)∞ depends on the trajectory of the median agent
of the distribution, that is then pivotal. In time 1, from (2.27), is evident
that ei1 ≥ ei0 if the citizen i is naive enough, i.e. if
ei0 ≤
(
1− δ
Ω
)( q
1− q
)
em0
More sophisticated agents instead will be driven by the political pro-
cess to decrease the investment in human capital. This reasoning im-
plies a convergence process according to which there exists a catching-
up period t∗ > 0 such that eit∗ = emt∗ and F (eit∗) is degenerate for every
t ∈ [t∗,∞). The dynamics of the system turns into a degenerate ergodic
process described by the following linear law of motion:
et =
[
1− δ
1− Ω(1− 1−qq )
]t
em0 ∀t ∈ [t∗,∞)
Let us call D = 1−δ
1−Ω
(
1− 1−qq
) . It follows that e∞ diverges for every D > 1,
i.e. for every
q >
2β(1− τ) + δ
4β(1− τ) ≡ q˜(β, δ, τ)
whereas it converges to zero for every D < 1. Finally it converges to em0
for every D = 1. Note that q˜ ≥ q¯ meaning that D > 1 when Ω > δ.
2.8.5 Proof of Proposition 7
The individual optimal tax rate is obtaining by solving the MPBE by
backward induction. Each citizen i, endowed with eit in time t, antici-
pates which is the optimal congruence rate of the ruler, λ∗t , and accord-
ingly solve maximization (2.32).
FOC requires V ′(τ) = 0. Since the maximization problem is quite
complex we constrain parameters to get analytical results to the follow-
ing values: β = 1 and δ = 0. We also initially set q = 0.25 to consider a
pessimistic scenario, i.e. one in which politicians is rationally expeted to
cheat, but later we allow q to vary. We also define i = eit/emt to be the
individual relative level of political sophistication.
In this scenario the only plausible solution is given by
τ∗(i|q = 0.25) = 2 + 3
8
(1− 3i)+
+
1
2
√
9
16 (1− 3i)4 + 38 (1− 3i)3 + 17(1− 3i)2 − 20(1− 3i)− 16
1− 3i
depicted in Fig. 2.7(a).
SOC tells us that τ∗(i|q = 0.25) is a maximum for any τ∗(i|q = 0.25)
satisfying the following inequality:
V ′′(τ∗(i|q = 0.25)) < 0
V ′′ = (1− 3i)
[1
2
(1− 3i)(τ∗ − 3
8
)− 1] < 0.
The SOC problem is illustrated in Fig. 2.10. As one may see τ∗(i|q =
0.25) is not a maximum for i ∈ (1/3, 9/10) for neither solutions. Then we
proceed by computing corner solutions. We limit to show it for i = 1/2,
but same results apply for any i ∈ (1/3, 9/10). It is straightforward to
see that
V(τ = 1|i = 0.5, q = 0.25) = 0,
Figure 2.10: Second order condition of the taxation maximization problem.
whereas
V(τ = 0|i = 0.5, q = 0.25) = 9
10
(eit)
2 > 0.
Since V(τ |i = 0.5, q = 0.25) is a monotonically decreasing function and
V(τ = 0|i = 0.5, q = 0.25) > V(τ = 1|i = 0.5, q = 0.25),
we conclude that τ = 0 is a corner solution for i = 0.5.
A more optimistic scenario, i.e. one in which the ruler is expected to
be congruent, is one with q = 0.75. In this scenario the only plausible
solution is given by
τ∗(i|q = 0.75) = 2
3
+
3
8
(1− 1
3
i)+
+
1
2
√
9
16 (1− 13i)4 + 92 (1− 13i)3 + 259 (1− 13i)2 − 203 (1− 13i)− 169
1− 13i
depicted in Fig. 2.7(b). SOC also shows that V ′′(τ∗(i|q = 0.75)) < 0
stands for any i.
Finally one may see that for q = 1 each citizen, regardless of his
own level of sophistication, knows that the politician in office is a per-
fect agent always playing λ∗t = 1. In such scenario
τ∗(q = 1) =
7
2
± 1
2
√
29 > 1.
2.8.6 Proof of Proposition 8
First of all, we show that eit+1(eit) is an increasing concave function. To
see that note:
∂eit+1
∂eit
=
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit)
]2 ≥ 0
∂2eit+1
∂2eit
= − (1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Ω(1− (1− λt)ηit)
]3 Ω(1− λt)e¯ ≤ 0
where both the inequalities hold by SOC, i.e. Ω ≤ 1. Furthermore, it lays
above the 45◦-line (∂eit+1/∂eit ≥ 1) for
eit ≤
[
(1− δ)1/2 − (1− Ω)1/2] (1− Ω)1/2
Ω(1− λt) e¯ ≡ e¯t(λt)
or, equally, for λt ≥ λ˜it(ηit), defined as
λt ≥ 1−
[
(1− δ)1/2 − (1− Ω)1/2] (1− Ω)1/2
Ωηit
≡ λ˜it(ηit)
which is an increasing function of ηit if and only if Ω ≥ δ. Therefore by
concavity we get, substituting in (2.18) eit+1 = eit = e∞, two steady-state
equilibria. If Ω ≥ δ,{
e∞ = 0 (unstable)
e∞ = Ω−δΩ(1−λ∞) e¯ ≥ 0 (stable)
Otherwise, {
e∞ = 0 (stable)
e∞ = Ω−δΩ(1−λ∞) e¯ ≤ 0 (unstable)
and all the citizens converge to a zero-level of human capital.
Finally, taking the limit of e∞ with respect to λ∞ we get, in the most
interesting case of Ω ≥ δ:
lim
λ∞→0
e∞ =
(
1− δ
Ω
)
e¯
lim
λ∞→1
e∞ = e¯
Figure 2.11: Bayesian inference in a society of n = 105 citizens where education
distributes uniformly.
Figure 2.12: Bayesian inference in a society of n = 105 citizens where education
distributes symmetrically.
Figure 2.13: Bayesian inference in a society of n = 105 citizens where the distribu-
tion of education is positive skewed (right-tailed).
Figure 2.14: Bayesian inference in a society of n = 105 citizens where the distribu-
tion of education is negative skewed (left-tailed).
Figure 2.15: Bayesian inference in an unequal society of n = 105 citizens where the
distribution of education is symmetric but fat tailed.
Figure 2.16: Set of admissible strategies for a politician who cares in reelection as a
function of ηm and q. The function λ∗(ηm, q) monotonically increases in ηm and q.
On the right of the contour line where λ∗(ηm, q) = 0 the pure strategy of cheating
is not admissible. On left side 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 is always greater than λ∗(ηm, q) as it is
now negative (see inequality (2.11)). Any combination of q and ηm in this area makes
viable for the government to cheat citizens. Note that even though voters think that
the state σ = H occurs almost surely (i.e. for q very close to one), a distribution of
education collapsed around zero allows the government to cheat them.
Figure 2.17: Private investments hit as a function of human capital stock eit for dif-
ferent values of ruler’s congruence rate λt. Parameters are: δ = 0, Ω = 0.4, and
e¯ = 10. The plots underlines the inelastic response of private investments with re-
spect to politics (on the left side) for naive persons .
Figure 2.18: λ˜(ηi0) distribution in a society of n = 105 citizens drawn with param-
eters δ = 0.2, β = 0.8, and τ = 0.3. Note that in a more skewed distribution more
citizens are willing to invest in human capital.
Figure 2.19: Different initial distributions of education follow different paths in
panel (a) whereas converge to a unique steady-state equilibrium (e∞ = 0) in
panel (b). Each line describes the trajectory of an individual i = 1, . . . , 103 for
t = 1, . . . , 100. Green lines draw a negative skewed distribution (η0 ∼ Beta(6, 2)),
red lines a symmetric one (η0 ∼ Beta(2, 2)), and blue lines a positive skewed one
(η0 ∼ Beta(2, 6)). Same colors describe same distributions at t = 1 among panel
(a) and (b). Note that convergence is caught up firstly by the sophisticated agents
(that for first know what is going on) whereas the last to catch up are the most naive
citizens.
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Chapter 3
A Political Psychology
Theory Of Populism
Why is it that certain countries keep repeating the same ‘mistakes’ and never
learn? In fact, once the political and institutional incentives and constraints
are taken into account, policies that appear to be mistakes are perfectly rational
responses to distorted or imperfect political incentives.
Alesina A. (1988)
There has been an increasing attention to populism in Political Econ-
omy in the last years. Economic theories attempting to explain pop-
ulism have mostly focused on politician’s incentive to conform to popu-
lar opinion. Starting from this literature (Harrington, 1993; Canes-Wrone
et al., 2001; Chiu, 2002; Heidhues and Lagerlo¨f, 2003; Maskin and Tirole,
2004), Frisel (2009) has argued that populist politicians are the ones that
always pander to the median voter’s preferences, regardless of the impli-
cations for the social welfare. Hodler, Loertscher, and Rohner (2010) went
further by arguing the incumbent uses inefficient policies to increase the
information asymmetry and improve his chances of reelection. More re-
cently Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2013) develop the idea, originally
proposed by Dornbush and Edwards (1991) in the field of Latin Amer-
ica, that an honest politician chooses populist leftist policies as a way of
71
signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right.
The Latin American countries experience has been broadly studied in
Political Science, since it rose an unresolved political puzzle according to
which populist politicians has been widely supported by the electorate
while ultimately hurt the economic interests of the majorities1. However,
in the last decades new forms of populism have appeared, especially in
Europe, and the increasing popularity of these parties are now presented
as the main threat to our democracy (Panizza, 2005), behaving in a dem-
agogic fashion and recklessly claiming big change for the better are pos-
sible and that they can make them happen (Albertazzi and McDonnell,
2008).
The rise of the new populism in Europe has been favored by what
Dahrendorf has arguably called the erosion of the ‘class’of politic (Dahren-
dorf, 1996). Along with significant changes in the underlying social struc-
ture, firstly and most importantly decades of political and economic sta-
bility, advanced countries have been experienced the emergence of a
new political class, to who Dahrendorf refers as ‘mediocre’, elected by
‘mediocre people’as a result of a changing in the relationship between
civil society and political institutions. This work attempts to model such
relationship and to explain the emergence and persistence over time of
the populism phenomenon in particular countries (and not in others) by
originally looking at the electorate side that, in different societies, may
be more or less sophisticated. The distribution of political sophistication
within a country generates different incentive structure for the incum-
bent that accordingly optimally decide whether to be a populist or a re-
sponsible type whereas between countries might determine completely
different equilibria in the long run, one with populist politicians and one
ruled by responsible ones. I argue that selfish politicians have the chance
to behave in a populist fashion when a naive electorate fail in keeping
rulers politically accountable. Naive voters are basically unaware of the
politicians intentions providing to the latter opportunities for the manip-
1The political science literature on populism is vast. Notable works include Dornbush
and Edwards (1991), Knight (1998), Edwards (2010), Levitsky and Roberts (2011), Connif et
al. (2012).
ulation of the economy and the electoral outcome, claiming that invest-
ment are viable in order to increase his expected future rents by increas-
ing the mean of the human capital distribution (which determines the
extent of the tax revenues) and, at the same time, by introducing more
spread (inequality) in the distribution. Such a strategy, carried out by
populist rulers, aimed to maximize electoral consensus, by enlarging the
naive segment of the society, and expected future rents by making the
rich segment of the society even richer.
To address the importance of information and communication in poli-
tics, we propose a dynamic signaling political model where citizens/voters
are endowed by different level of education and, according to his own
level of education, each of them codifies the signal (the announcement
on public investment) sent by the ruler differently (see Be´nabou and Ti-
role, 2002). Despite the signal is costless, it still conveys information to
the electorate who may guess investment are viable when actually they
are utterly inefficient. Despite citizens do prefer more public investments
that increase individual productivity, they are politically committed to
responsible economic policy never allowing politicians in office to run
investments whose costs exceed the individual benefit. Once it is as-
sessed that the ruler is indeed a populist type, citizens react by voting
him out and replacing him with a challenger. Such level of awareness
is never achieved by naive citizens who accordingly never oppose to a
reelection of a populist ruler. Therefore, populist politicians build their
consensus on the naive segment of the society that, being unaware, re-
sults to be easily manipulable by the former ones. Once elected, their
actions ultimately advantage the rich who anticipate he is reckless and,
despite the political commitment, responds by carrying out more invest-
ment in human capital. At the end of day, any political commitment to
keep economic policy responsible turns to be economically non credible.
This mechanism outlines non negligible differences in the long run
among different society endowed by different initial education distribu-
tion. Politicians increase their rents by ruling over naive and unequal so-
cieties, that is one in which the median is naive enough to allow political
manipulation and the mean is high enough to increase expected future
tax revenues. The initial distribution of education is crucial to determine
the mechanisms of such a process, shaping the economic/political de-
velopment path of a country. If the bad state of the world is persistent
enough, this process may generate long run equilibria characterized by
poverty traps, that involve the naive segment of the society, and high
inequality. Fortunately, this is not expected to happen in sophisticated
societies. We show how more sophisticated society are more able to ac-
count for populist politicians that in turn are less likely to lie. As a result
sophisticated society converge to an equilibrium with less inequality and
higher incomes.
The fact that a minoritarian part of the electorate, the e´lite, gets better
with populist policies is a milestone of the literature on populism. Ar-
guably, this suddenly arises a puzzle on the political sustainability over
time of such a policy, that has not very clearly discussed in the aforemen-
tioned literature, and still presents in all the countries involved, starting
from the America Latina countries. Why political support for keeping
populist rulers accountable does not arise? Why should the majority
bring support to a populist ruler if, in the long run, he leads them to
poverty? The answer here proposed, using tools of political psychology,
is that the naive majority is not very well aware of politicians intentions
and accordingly it is not prepared to fight for. As long as the govern-
ment budget constraint binds, their naivete´ persists and broadens over
time getting room for rulers to behave (increasingly) in a populist fash-
ion.
Populism is therefore of primary urgency in not well functioning de-
mocracies where the electorate is, to a great extent, naive that are more
prone to believe to populist announcements and to be cheated by self-
ish politicians. We propose a novel explanation according to which more
educated societies are more able to punish politicians that, in turn, only
invest in public goods when it is responsibly possible. The combina-
tion of the accumulation and political mechanism creates the potential
for multiple steady states, one for societies with low education and pop-
ulist rulers and one for societies with high education and responsible
rulers.
This chapter is organized as follows. Despite the main features of
the model are basically invariant with respect to the model introduced
in Chapter 2, in Section 3.1 we shall discuss the way populism affects
voters beliefs, and we shall introduce the voting rules. The Markov Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium will be characterized in Section 3.2, firstly dis-
cussing how the accumulation process is affected by the institutional set-
ting and then endogeneizing political choices as best responses of the
sophistication rate of the electorate (via accountability). Section 3.3 dis-
cusses the dynamic implication of the political economic interaction and
multiple equilibria are characterized. Section 3.4 concludes.
3.1 The model
3.1.1 Information and beliefs
In Chapter 2 we have considered the rulers incentives of lying the elec-
torate when things go well, i.e. in stateH , convincing them that no public
investment are viable and pocketing what is left of the tax revenues by
himself. In state L, nothing happened and citizens know that there is
no room for the ruler to behave strategically, regardless of the level of
sophistication. In reality, the incumbent may have the incentive to claim
that investment are rather efficient (i.e. H-type investment) in order to
expected future rents. This symmetric scenario allow us to study the con-
sequences of a reckless incumbent politician that makes inefficient public
investment even in state L.
We define this attitude of politicians as populism. Politicians are reck-
less with rate 1−γt and, according to his own level of sophistication, each
citizen i guesses that the incumbent ruler is following populist policies
with probability (or reckless rate)
P (σˆit = H|σt = L) = (1− γt)ηit (3.1)
where γt = 0 stands for a fully populist ruler and γt = 1 for responsible
type. However we allow γt to range as a continuum from 0 to 1. With
P (σˆit = L|σt = L) = 1− (1− γt)ηit (3.2)
the ruler is rather thought to be responsible, always signaling the right
state. As one may see, fully naive citizens, with ηit = 0, always believe
that the ruler is a congruent type always signaling the right state of the
world independently from his true type, i.e. an admissible value of γt.
To keep things easy we impose throughout λt = 1 such that in state
H public investments are always provided. As in Chapter 2 we allow
each citizen to infer the probability that the ruler is cheating, signaling
H when actually the true state is L by using the following awareness-
management model a` la Be´nabou-Tirole:
pit(γt, η
i
t, q) ≡ P (σt = L|σˆit = H; γt, ηit)
=
(1− q)(1− γt)ηit
q + (1− q)(1− γt)ηit
(3.3)
3.1.2 Timing of events
The timing of events within every period is as follows:
T1 Nature draws σt = {H,L}, that is private information of the ruler.
Each citizen inherits eit from the private investment made at time
t − 1 and benefits from the public investment made by the former
government, Gt−1.
T2 Politician in office chooses the action γt, the rate of economic policy
responsibility, and, accordingly, invest in a public good (that will be
productive in t+ 1), i.e. chooses Gt = {0, 1}.
T3 Citizens plan to invest hit in human capital based on their beliefs on
the ruler’s type and, simultaneously, elections are held (the median
citizen chooses ϕt = {0, 1} based on posterior beliefs).
T4 Payoffs are given by rents and consumptions to politician and citi-
zens respectively.
3.2 The Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
3.2.1 Elections
Citizens vote retrospectively according to the evidence they have col-
lected on political announces. Since the government’s strategy is realized
only after the elections, only individual beliefs are involved in the infer-
ential process. Every citizen i processes all the informations collected
and votes again for the incumbent if she has no evidence of the fraud, i.e.
iff the evidence Et in favor of the hypothesis pit is not positive:
E(pit) ≡ log
( pit
1− pit
)
≤ 0 (3.4)
which occurs where pit ≤ 1/2. It in turn means that if the majority of them
has no evidence about the cheating move of the policymaker he will be
reelected, contingency that occurs when P (pit ≤ 1/2) = F (1/2) ≥ 1/2.
Now, given 0 ≤ pmt ≤ q with F (pmt ) = 1/2, we require that
F
(1
2
)
≥ 1
2
= F (pmt )⇐⇒ pmt ≤
1
2
(3.5)
by monotonicity of F (·). In other words, it turns out that the policymaker
won’t be reappointed if the median citizen thinks that he is plausibly
cheating them. Therefore, if politician cares about reelection he would
be willing to push down pmt at least to 1/2. This is of course easier in a
society where people can easily be made fools, i.e. in one with a skewed
distribution of ηit. We summarize this result in Proposition 1:
PROPOSITION 1: Let pmt (γt, ηmt , q) ≡ P (σt = L|σˆmt = H; γt, ηmt ).
(i) If pmt (γt, ηmt , q) ≤ 12 the optimal strategy in the stage game is to play
ϕt = 1.
(ii) If pmt (γt, ηmt , q) >
1
2 the incumbent will not be retained (i.e. ϕt = 0).
Substituting (3.3) into (3.5), we get the set of admissible strategies for
a policymaker who cares about reelection:
γt ≥ 1− 1
ηmt
q
1− q ≡ γ
∗
t (η
m
t , q) (3.6)
Figure 3.1: Public investments subgame. Note that when the state is thought to be
strong every citizens know that the ruler will play Gt = GHHˆ = 1, no matter the
educational level of him. On the contrary, when the state is thought to be weak public
investments can be positive (GLHˆ = 1) or null (GLLˆ = 0) with probabilities given
respectively by equations (3.1) and (3.2).
such that the optimal strategy of the ruler is to play
max
[
0, γ∗t (η
m
t , q)
]
≤ γt ≤ 1. (3.7)
It is worth noting that ∂γ∗t /∂ηmt ≥ 0, i.e. that a more sophisticated soci-
ety force the incumbent to be more responsible. This is what I mean by
sophisticated accountability.
3.2.2 The accumulation process under inefficient projects
In period T3, citizens, along with voting, invest in human capital based
on their beliefs on the ruler’s type. According to Figure 3.1, politicians
are thought of to invest in state L using the following mixed strategy:
GLt =
{
1 with (1− γt)ηit
0 with 1− (1− γt)ηit
(3.8)
whereas GHt = 1 with certainty.
Investment in state L involve only inefficient projects characterized
by a fraction κL of unproductive returns. The rate of inefficiency of a
public project is therefore a contingent state parameter that takes values
κH = 0 and κL > 0.
ASSUMPTION 1: Let e¯t+1 = max(eit+1) and B the cost of the project.
κL ≥ E[e¯t+1]
2 −B
E[e¯t+1]2
. (3.9)
Assumption 1 says that social costs coming from inefficient projects
exceed individual benefits2. When Assumption 1 holds even the rich-
est citizen individually gets less than what the government spends for
the inefficient project. We now introduce a further assumption aimed at
allowing citizens to internalize this social cost.
ASSUMPTION 2: Citizens are politically committed to responsible eco-
nomic policy.
Assumption 2 is justified from the fact that rational citizens look for-
ward to the catastrophic consequences to follow populist policies over
time anticipating that in the future there might be greater losses3. Under
Assumptions 1 and 2 any politician that is believed to be reckless will not
be retained. This is because citizens internalize the social cost that comes
from investing in an inefficient project.
Note that Assumption 2 introduces a political commitment but noth-
ing says on the rational economic behavior that each citizens will take
in time T3. Note further, from equation (3.4), that naive citizens fail in
collecting all the information to be aware of the politician intentions so
as, despite all the citizens potentially are politically committed to eco-
nomic responsibility, they might, in absence of any evidence, reelect the
populist type.
It follows that the expected future individual output will be
Et(yit+1) =
[
P (σˆit = H|σt = H)P (σt = H)
+ P (σˆit = H|σt = L)P (σt = L)(1− κ)
]
(eit+1)
α
=
[
q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit
]
(eit+1)
α
(3.10)
2One may see that by comparing the expected utility that each citizen iwill take in state
L under inefficient investment, (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηitE[eit+1]2, with the correspondent
expected social costs, (1− q)(1− γt)B. Assumption 1 amounts to state that ηitE[eit+1]2 ≤
B + κηitE[eit+1]2 for each i.
3One way to do so is to introduce a negative drift, ν(γt), in the law of motion of qt+1(qt),
characterized in Section 2.7.1, increasing in the populist attitude of the ruler. In this fashion,
where (1 − κ)(1 − γt)ηit(eit+1)α are informational rents of sophisticated
citizens that occur when the state of the world is L, the politician in office
is not fully responsible, and κ < 1.
Recursively, each citizen maximizes the expected current period re-
turn that will be consumed according to (2.4) and the agent i’s intertem-
poral utility at time t is
V (eit) = max
hit
{
(1− τ)yit −
1
φ
(hit)
φ + βq
[
Et
[
V H(eit+1)|σˆi = H
]
+
+ Et
[
V H(eit+1)|σˆi = L
]]
+ β(1− q)
[
Et
[
V L(eit+1)|σˆi = H
]
+
+ Et
[
V L(eit+1)|σˆi = L
]]}
(3.11)
where current output are given by (2.14). Maximization yields the opti-
mal effort taking in by each citizen i as a function of the state variable of
the economy, eit, and political institution, γt.
PROPOSITION 2: Let Γ ≡ 2β(1− τ) ≤ 1. In every period t, each citizen i
optimally chooses a level of investment increasing with the populist attitude of
the ruler. The reaction to a populist announcement is as strong as larger is the
level of sophistication ηit.
hit(e
i
t; γt) = (1− δ)
[
Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)
1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)
]
eit (3.12)
When the state is σt = L the need for responsible politicians ruling
public business is more subtle. A responsible ruler is indeed a brake for
the accumulation process of human capital, at least in the short term, and
producers react to higher values of γt decreasing private investment, i.e.
∂hit/∂γt ≤ 0. The question of who is the perfect agent suddenly arises but
such a dilemma only involves sophisticated citizens who, while politi-
cally committed to responsible economic policy, take advantage from this
the law of motion of qt becomes qt+1 = (1 − ξ) − ν(γt) + (2ξ − 1)qt and higher values
Figure 3.2: Private investments hit as a function of human capital stock eit for dif-
ferent values of ruler’s rate of responsability γt. Parameters are: δ = 0, Ω = 0.4,
q = 0.5, κ = 0, and e¯ = 10. The plots underlines the inelastic response of private
investments with respect to politics (on the left side) for naive persons.
policy in an increasing fashion to his level of awareness (∂2hit/∂γt∂eit ≤
0), as Figure 3.2 shows.
Exogenous parameters also shape the optimal investment effort. For
example, taxation (τ ) discourage private investments as well as a greater
depreciation (δ) of human capital and a greater extent of unproductive
returns of the investment (κ). Conversely, regardless the state σt, more
patient agents (β) are more willing to invest in order to consume more
in the future. Finally, an higher belief on the occurrence of the state H
makes investments going up (i.e. ∂hit/∂q ≥ 0). However, thanks to pop-
ulist policies, even when q = 0 citizens are still encouraged to invest in
human capital and the investment is found to be monotonically increas-
ing with eit.
Looking at the motion of the human capital
eit+1(e
i
t; γt) =
1− δ
1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)
eit (3.13)
of ν(·) make the state L more likely to occur in the future. To keep things easy, we assume
that ξ = 1 and ν(γt) = 0.
that differently from the rent seeking case (see Chapter 2)4, is found to be
convex with eit. The consequences of the convexity of the state equation
are striking and they are summarized in Proposition 3.
PROPOSITION 3: Let Ω ≤ 1.
(i) If q is sufficiently small (δ ≥ Ω), there is only one stable steady state
equilibrium represented by e∞ = 0.
(a) Naive citizens with a human capital level below
e∞(γ∞) =
δ − Ω
Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γ∞) e¯ (3.14)
converge to a zero level of education (e∞ = 0).
(b) Richest citizens with ei0 > e∞(γ∞) accumulate over time taking
advantage of populist announcements.
(ii) If q is sufficiently high (Ω ≥ δ), productive public investment are more
likely and society (but the unskilled) accumulate over time getting more
educated.
Conversely with the rent-seeking case, here all the insights of mo-
del are brought up from the state σt = L. First of all, the model pre-
dicts that richest citizens (and only them), i.e. those with ei0 > e∞(γ∞),
take advantage of populist politicians, getting reacher and reacher over
time. Although, the fact that a minoritarian part of the electorate gets
better with populist policies is a milestone of the literature on populism,
this suddenly arises a puzzle on the political sustainability over time of
such a policy, not very clearly discussed in the aforementioned literature,
and still present in all the countries involved, starting from the America
Latina countries5. As the model predicts, if em0 < e∞(γ∞), the majority
4In Chapter 2 κ is set to be 0.
5While initially the strongest experiments of populism in Latin America obtained re-
markable economic goals on the side of the budget deficit, nominal wages, growth, and in
fostering industrialization (Kauffman and Stalling, 1991), they sooner or later run into se-
rious external bottleneck that led these countries to economic and political collapse. This
of the society experiments, in the long run equilibrium, an indirect loss
from such a policy. So why political support for keeping populist rulers
accountable does not arise? Why should the majority bring support to
a populist ruler if, in the long run, he leads them to poverty? The an-
swer here proposed is that the naive majority is not very well aware of
politicians intentions and accordingly it is not prepared to fight for and,
as long as δ ≤ Ω, their naivete persists and broadens over time getting
room for rulers to behave (increasingly) in a populist fashion.
Turning back to the role of political institutions, it is worth noting that
γ∞ → 1 pushes the unstable equilibrium e∞(γ∞ → 1) →∞ slowing the
speed of convergence to e∞ = 0, waiting for better moments. Things are
persistently bad, and in the long run a high probability of having σt =
L leads, despite the responsibility of the polity, the society (and all the
citizens there in) to poverty. However, the slowness of the convergence
may increase the likelihood that some external shocks move the society
toward another development path (turning σt from L to H).
3.2.3 The political process
We now turn on the political process through which sophisticated citi-
zens bind reckless politicians. This allows us to explain away why only
some country deals with populism whereas others do not.
In T2 the ruler anticipates what is the level of private investments
made by each citizen i and, accordingly, chooses the optimal rate of po-
litical responsibility γt = P (σˆt = L|σt = L), ranged according to (3.7).
After that, the politician decides whether or not to invest in the public
good with probability γt, that is:
GLt =
{
1 with 1− γt
0 with γt
(3.15)
The problem of the ruler turns to be a constrained maximization prob-
has been the case for example of Salvador Allende in Chile (1970-73), of Juan Peron in Ar-
gentina (1973-76), and Alan Garcia in Peru (1985-90), among others.
lem of the following kind:
max
γt
V rt (γt) = Tt − [q + (1− q)(1− γt)]B + βEt
[
V rt+1(γt)
]
s.t. (3.7)
(3.16)
The public good will be implemented either if the state isH or if the state
is L and the ruler is not completely responsible. Overall, the expected
cost is [q + (1 − q)(1 − γt)]B where B = bTt, with b ∈ [0, 1] by imperfect
credit markets. Political decisions are also expected to influence future
rents, in case of reelection, by determining the future (average) income
of the economy, mt+1, via the accumulation process. It follows that mt
is exactly identical to the rent-seeking case, but not the expected future
human capital, µt+1, and wealth that are obtaining, respectively, from
equation (3.13) and (3.10)6:
µt+1 = µt +
∆2t
2
+ (Ω− δ)− Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt (3.17)
mt+1 = 2µt+∆
2
t+2(Ω−δ)−2Γ(1−q)(1−κ)(1−γt)ηt+
1− q
q
(1−κ)(1−γt)ηt
(3.18)
with ηt = exp(µt + ∆2/2)/e¯. The problem (3.16) therefore can be reex-
pressed as
lnV rt (γt) = max
λt
{
ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t − [q + (1− q)(1− γt)]b
+ βEt
[
lnV rt+1(γt)
]}
s.t. (3.7)
(3.19)
Maximizing rents amounts to choice an optimal populism rate, ranged
according to (3.7). By doing that the incumbent trades off future tax rev-
enues with current rents coming from greater (unsustainable) public in-
vestment. Due to the linear functional form of rents, it is easy to note that
∂ lnV rt /∂γt ≤ 0 iff
b ≤ β
(
1− 2Ω
q
)
(1− κ)ηt ≡ b(β, q, τ, κ, ηt) (3.20)
with ηt ≡ exp(µt + ∆2t/2)/e¯. In other words, rents are found to be de-
6Proofs are gathered in the appendix.
creasing with his rate of being responsible provided that the cost of the
public investment, relative to tax revenues, is small enough. Interest-
ingly, the threshold b is found to be increasing with β, q, −τ , and −κ,
meaning that better economic conditions rise the incumbent’s incentives
to behave in a populist fashion. When condition (3.20) holds, incumbent
rulers maximize office rents by pushing down γt as much as they can.
However, given the accountability effort exerted by voters, the lowest
still optimal value is the maximum between γ∗t = 1 − (1/ηmt )(q/(1 − q))
and zero, according to (3.7). We summarize this result in Proposition 4:
PROPOSITION 4: Political equilibrium. Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20).
There exists b and b¯, such that:
(i) If b ≤ b the incumbent plays γt = γ∗t (ηmt ) and the median voter plays
ϕt = 1.
(ii) If b ∈ (b, b¯(δ)) the incumbent plays γt = 1 and the median voter plays
ϕt = 1.
(iii) If b ≥ b¯(δ) the incumbent plays γt = 0 and the median voter plays ϕt = 0
(Go-for-Broke).
When public investments are not so costly the incumbent takes the
electoral advantage against the opponent behaving as a populist politi-
cian by pushing the rate γt to be the lowest possible value. However, in a
sophisticated society he must be responsible enough and, as a result, the
optimal rate of responsibility is:
γ∗t = 1−
1
ηmt
( q
1− q
)
(3.21)
that is decreasing in q but increasing in the overall society’s level of so-
phistication.
The cost of the public good drives political decisions for a given dis-
tribution of education in the society. When b is higher than b (i.e. b > b)
there is no incentive to cheat the electorate because investing recklessly
is no longer sustainable as greater as the future discount factor increases
(∂b/∂β ≤ 0). As Figure 3.3 points out there is a cut-point b¯ ≥ b such
Figure 3.3: Political Equilibrium as a function of b.
that the cost of the project, while feasible (i.e. b ≤ 1), could be so high
to incentive the ruler to go-for-broke. If b ≥ b¯ playing go-for-broke by
extracting all the tax revenues strictly dominates γt = 1. The median
voter anticipates that for every b > b¯ the incumbent would Go-for-Broke
optimally responding by assigning probability zero on the event that the
ruler plays γt = 1. Consequently, the median voter plays ϕt = 0 and the
ruler, that anticipates this move, goes-for-broke.
In the Appendix we also show that b¯(δ) is a decreasing function of
the depreciation rate of the human capital of the producers so as for high
level of δ Go-for-Broke is more likely to be the optimal strategy in the
stage game. In particular, there exists a threshold δ∗ such that for any
δ < δ∗ Going-for-Broke is not an admissible strategy for the ruler, i.e.
b¯(δ) > 1.
From now on we shall entirely focus on the more interesting case
where b ≤ b.
3.2.4 The characterization of the MPBE
Once γt, and then Gt, are realized citizens come to know what is their
pay-off, that is how much they have really invested and what is their
production and what will be their human capital level in next periods:
hit(e
i
t; q, e
m
t ) = (1− δ)
[
Ω(1 + (1− κ) eitemt )
1− Ω(1 + (1− κ) eitemt )
]
eit (3.22)
eit+1(e
i
t; q, e
m
t ) =
1− δ
1− Ω(1 + (1− κ) eitemt )
eit (3.23)
Conversely with the rent-seeking case, all the MPBE values are now de-
creasing with the general level of sophistication of the society, emt . A
more sophisticated pivotal voter is indeed now more aware of the long-
term drawbacks of public investment therefore acting as a brake for the
short-term accumulation process. This positive external (long-term) ef-
fect, discussed in the subsequent subsection, works through the account-
ability effort pushed by the median citizen, that makes more likely a fair
political environment.
Overall, the MBP equilibrium can be summarized in following Propo-
sition:
PROPOSITION 5: Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20), there exists a unique Markov
Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium such that
(i) If the state is strong (σt = H) the incumbent ruler does invest (Gt =
1). Citizens know that and respond by investing hit = (1 − δ)Ω/(1 −
Ω), according to the parameters that govern the economy and regardless
of the education they have; future stocks of human capital are then in
equilibrium equal to eit+1 = (1− δ)eit/(1− Ω).
(ii) If the state is weak (σt = L) the incumbent ruler has the incentive to
cheat citizens that in turn bind politicians by accountability. The ruler
cares to be reappointed and the optimal strategy is given by (3.21) when
condition (3.20) holds. Citizens, on the other side, guess the ruler does
invest (Gt = 1) with probability (1− γt)ηit and respond by investing and
accumulating according to (3.22) and (3.23), respectively.
3.3 Dynamics and multiple steady states
The initial distribution of human capital strongly shapes the dynamics
of the economy, political choices, and agents incentives. Right tailed
distributions are mostly composed by naive agents who barely account
for ruler’s duties that, in turn, are allowed to implement populist polity
(by playing small values of γt). However, these polities ultimately turn
to have, in the long-run, atrocious effects for the former. Sophisticated
agents (or the elite) instead take advantage from populist claims getting
reacher and reacher. The result of a long-lasting period characterized by
the impossibility of making productive public investment is therefore the
rising of the inequality when populist politicians have the chance to gov-
ern the country. This is very implausible in highly sophisticated coun-
tries where sophisticated electoral accountability imposes to the ruler
high values of γt as the price for reappointment. However, persistent
crises may reduce the general level of sophistication of the society and
encourage rulers to behave recklessly for electoral purposes.
The long-run equilibrium of the economy is then strictly depending
on the initial distribution of the education and it is found as the solution
of the following system which describes the joint evolution of education
and policy in the economy:{
eit+1 = χ(e
i
t; γt, e
m
t )
γt = Υ(e
m
t )
(3.24)
Two values solve the system above, and only one of them, e∞ = 0, is
found to be stable. The other long-run human capital level, below, is
indeed unstable:
e∞ =
( δ
Ω
− 1
) em∞
1− κ (3.25)
Given the convex shape of χ(·) all the citizens with ei0 < e∞ will con-
verge, when q < q¯(β, δ, τ), to zero as quickly as em∞, that in turn is a
function of em0 , is small. The others will accumulate more and more and,
as a result, the inequality dramatically increases.
The process can be attenuated in a sophisticated society. Here a high
level of em∞ reduces the speed of convergence to e∞ = 0, increasing the
likelihood that some external shocks move the economy toward another
development path. The model thus predicts multiple steady-states, one
for naive societies that quickly converges to a poverty state, character-
ized by high inequality, thanks to populist politicians and one for so-
phisticated societies where political accountability impedes the advent
of populism if the crises is not persistent enough.
However two societies with the same initial conditions, and in par-
ticular with the same initial distribution of education, can nonetheless
be driven toward two different steady-states, depending on the level
of optimism (q), the faith in the future (β), taxation (τ ), inefficiency of
the bureaucratic apparatus (κ), and human capital depreciation (δ). We
summarize these results in Proposition 6. Proofs are gathered in the Ap-
pendix.
PROPOSITION 6: When citizens are pessimists enough, i.e. if q < q¯(β, δ, τ),
(or equivalently when the depreciation rate is above a critical value δ¯(β, q, τ)),
multiple stable steady-states arise, and initially less educated societies quickly
converge to a state characterized by huge poverty, high inequality, and populist
politicians. Conversely, if q ≥ q¯(β, δ, τ) society get reacher and reacher, no
matter initial conditions.
3.4 Conclusions
The Chapter explores the rise and persistence of populist regimes in
naive society that leaves room to selfish politicians to stay in power by
promising that everything can be done and they can make them happen.
This work particularly addresses the rise of the new wave of populism
in Europe starting from the fall of the Berlin wall. The politics of Berlus-
coni and Bossi in Italy (followed up by the recent entry of Beppe Grillo
with the Movimento 5 Stelle in politics), Haider in Austria and Le Pen in
France have been mostly characterized by the paramount importance of
comunication and promises that have capture the attention of the weak-
est part of the electorate. Although such promises embody all the chara-
teristics of a cheap talking messages a´ la Crawford and Sobel (1982), the
fortune of such politicians has been great indeed, especially Berlusconi’s
who reigned in Italy for about twenty years.
The explanation proposed by this Chapter relies on the ability of the
electorate in keeping rulers accountable. Similarly to Chapter 2, politi-
cal accountability pass through the political sophistication of the voters
that defines the individual level of awareness over the type of the politi-
cian, and, in particular, on the pivotal role of the median voter. Once
the median gets aware that such promises are unreliable he votes out
the populist incumbent electing the challenger. In this case, we say the
society is sophisticated enough to be ruled by a populist politician.
Despite the model follows a framework a´ la Ferejhon (1986), if the
challenger would like to stay in power for a second appointment he must
increase his willingness to tell the truth. Henceforth, despite the simulta-
neous equality between politicians, the model predicts a persistent dis-
parity that increases over time and that in turn, by investment in human
capital, favors a persistent process of sophistication, as we observe now
the tail of it in the developed countries, or increasing inequality, as we
rather observe in the Latin America Continent, depending on the initial
distribution of the society in term of political sophistication. Thus the
model additionally predicts disparity on the types of the politicians rul-
ing between different countries.
The dynamics of the political/economic system, illustrated in sec-
tions , also sheds lights on the sustainability of the self-detrimental pro-
cesses that have led Latin American poor to get poorer over time and
eventually to loose everything as in Peronian Argentina and on the en-
dogenous process that favor the advent of populism the more the soci-
ety gets poor and naive. Although these processes apparently look as
irrational, once we introduce tools of political psychology that puzzle
brights itself: Naive voters are basically unaware of the politicians in-
tentions providing to the latter opportunities for the manipulation of the
economy and the electoral outcome. However, as far as sophisticated
citizens are the majority, manipulation would be hard to be carried out.
According to that the model also proposes a new explanation for the
rise of the inequality that not relies on the initial inequality itself, but on
a political psychology process that potentially holds for any non degen-
erate initial distribution of education.
The understanding of the populism must pass through a better un-
derstanding of the society. There is no populism because there are no
bad politicians in that country but because the society is sufficiently so-
phisticated to held a democracy. In other words, a mediocre political
class is elected by a mediocre people in a democracy (Dahrendorf, 1996).
3.5 Proofs
3.5.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Claim 1: there exists a unique optimal level of private investment as a function
of the own level of education and the reckless rate of the ruler.
Proof: The first order condition of maximization (3.11) is
(hit)
φ−1 = βqV ′(eit+1)
that equals the costs of investing one unit more today, on the left hand
side, to the expected marginal benefits from getting more educated in the
future, on the right hand side: these are namely an increasing in future
output and the catch up of higher political sophistication. The solution of
the FOC uses the standard envelope condition to compute the expected
future marginal benefits:
V ′t+1 = α(1− τ)(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)(eit+1)α−1
Hence, we are left with
(hit)
φ−1 = αβ(1− τ)(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)(eit+1)α−1
To get an analytical solution we constrain the human capital elasticity
α = 2 and investment costs to be quadratic (i.e. φ = 2). This yields
equation (3.12). To prove that solution (3.12) is also unique we compute
the second order condition (∂2V/∂2hit ≤ 0) that is satisfied iff
1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit) ≥ 0
Since (q+ (1− q)(1−κ)(1− γt)ηit) ≤ 1, a sufficient condition for the SOC
to hold is that Γ ≡ 2β(1− τH) ≤ 1.
Claim 2: Citizens optimally respond to politicians’ reckless rate by increas-
ing private investments when −γt increases.
Proof: To prove that, we need to demonstrate that ∂hit/∂γt ≤ 0. Let
us define A ≡ Γ(q + (1 − q)(1 − κ)(1 − γt)ηit). Differentiation of (3.12)
yields:
∂hit
∂γt
=
(1− δ)eit
1−A
∂A
∂γt
+
(1− δ)Aeit
(1−A)2
∂A
∂γt
=
(1− δ)eit
1−A
∂A
∂γt
(
1 +
A
1−A
)
≤ 0
given that ∂A/∂γt ≤ 0.
Claim 3: The reaction to a populist announcement is as strong as larger is
the level of sophistication.
Proof: The statement requires that ∂2hit/∂γt∂eit ≤ 0. Straight differ-
entiation yields:
∂2hit
∂γt∂eit
= − (1− δ)Γ(1− q)
1−A
[
2ηit −
1
1−A
[
(1− γt) ∂A
∂γt
(1 + 3eit)− 2Ωeit
]
− (1− γt)
(1−A)2
∂A
∂γt
eit
[
Ω− (1− γt) ∂A
∂γt
]]
≤ 0
given that ∂A/∂γt ≤ 0.
3.5.2 Proof of Proposition 3
First of all, we show that eit+1(eit) is an increasing convex function. To see
that note:
∂eit+1
∂eit
=
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)
]2 ≥ 0
∂2eit+1
∂2eit
=
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)
]3 Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)e¯ ≥ 0
where the second inequality holds by SOC, i.e. Γ ≤ 1. Furthermore, it
lays below the 45◦-line (∂eit+1/∂eit ≥ 1) for eit ∈ (0, e¯t(γt)), i.e.
eit ≥
(1− Ω)1/2[(1− Ω)1/2 − (1− δ)1/2]
Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt) e¯ ≡ e¯t(γt).
Therefore by convexity we get, substituting in (3.13) eit+1 = eit = e∞, two
steady-state equilibria. If Ω ≥ δ,{
e∞ = 0 (stable)
e∞ = δ−ΩΓ(1−q)(1−κ)(1−γ∞) e¯ ≥ 0 (unstable)
Otherwise, {
e∞ = 0 (unstable)
e∞ = δ−ΩΓ(1−q)(1−κ)(1−γ∞) e¯ ≤ 0 (stable)
Finally, taking the limit of e∞ with respect to γ∞ we get, in the most
interesting case of Ω ≤ δ:
lim
γ∞→0
e∞ =
δ − Ω
(Γ− Ω)(1− κ) e¯
lim
γ∞→1
e∞ = e¯
3.5.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Assume ln ei0 ∼ N (µ0,∆20). To show that eit keeps distributing lognor-
mally over time let us call
ξi0 = 1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γ0)ηi0)
= (1− Ω) + (Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γ0)/e¯)ei0
Since ei0 distribute lognormally, with mean µ0 and variance ∆20, and the
other terms in ξi0 are constants, ξi0 must distribute lognormally as well
with mean (1−Ω)− (µ0 + ln Γ + ln(1− q) + ln(1− κ) + ln(1− γ0)− ln e¯)
and variance ∆20. Finally, note that the sum of log-normal distributions
yields, under broad conditions, another lognormal distribution.
If ln eit ∼ N (µt,∆2t ) then yit = (eit)2 is a transformation of eit and must
distribute as a lognormal too: ln yit ∼ N (mt, v2t ), with mt = 2µt + ∆2t .
The law of motion of aggregated level of human capital is obtained
from (3.13). Taking a logarithmic transformation in both sides we are left
with
ln eit+1 = ln e
i
t + ln(1− δ)− ln(1− Γ(q + (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηit)))
≈ ln eit − δ + Ω− Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt
for small values of δ and Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt. Averaging yields:
µt+1 = µt +
∆2t
2
+ (Ω− δ)− Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt,
with ηt ≡ exp(µt + ∆2t/2)/e¯.
At the same way, we can compute the expected output in t+ 1 of the
economy; taking a logarithmic transformation of (3.10) yields:
ln yit+1 = 2 ln e
i
t+1 + ln
[
q
(
1 +
1− q
q
(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt
)]
≈ 2 ln eit+1 +
1− q
q
(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt + ln(q)
Taking the average:
mt+1 = 2µt+1 +
1− q
q
(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt + ln(q)
= 2µt + ∆
2
t + 2(Ω− δ)− 2Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt
+
1− q
q
(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt + ln(q)
= mt + 2(Ω− δ)− 2Γ(1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt
+
1− q
q
(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt + ln(q)
In time T2 the incumbent ruler faces the following maximization prob-
lem:
V rt (γt) = max
γt
{
τyt− [q+ (1− q)(1− γt)]bτyt +βEt
[
V rt+1(γt)
]}
s.t. (3.7)
Taking a logarithmic transformation yields:
lnV rt (γt) = max
γt
{
ln τ + ln yt + ln(1− [q + (1− q)(1− γt)]b)
+ βEt
[
lnV rt+1(γt)
]}
s.t. (3.7)
≈ max
γt
{
ln τ + ln yt − [q + (1− q)(1− γt)]b
+ βEt
[
lnV rt+1(γt)
]}
s.t. (3.7)
= max
γt
{
ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t − [q + (1− q)(1− γt)]b
+ βEt
[
lnV rt+1(γt)
]}
s.t. (3.7)
where
Et
[
lnV rt+1(γt)
]
= ln q + ln τ +mt+1
= ln q + ln τ + 2µt + ∆
2
t + 2(Ω− δ)
+ (1− q)(1− κ)(1− γt)ηt
[
2Γ− 1
q
]
Since the program is linear in γt, it is easy to note that
∂ lnV rt
∂γt
= (1− q)b− β(1− q)(1− κ)
(1− 2Ω
q
)
ηt
that is negative if and only if condition (3.20) is satisfied, that is if the cost
of the public investment, relative to tax revenues, is small enough.
We now show that there exists a cutpoint-cost of the public good b¯
such that for every b > b¯ the ruler strictly prefer to going-for-broke in-
stead of playing a strategy γt = 1. We first show that, at time T2, the
value function of going-for-broke is strictly greater than the value taken
by being responsible (note that, unlike the rent-seeking case, it is suffi-
cient to show it for γt = 1 since the value function is increasing with γt
for any b > b). Let us call Vrt ≡ lnV rt (γt = 1).
Vrt < Tt
ln τ+2µt+∆
2
t > (1+β) ln τ+2(1+β)µt+(1+β)∆
2
t−qb+β ln q+2β(Ω−δ)
Solving by b yields b¯(δ):
b¯(δ) ≡ 1
q
[β ln τq +mt + 2β(Ω− δ)].
Note that b¯(δ) is a decreasing function of the depreciation rate of the hu-
man capital of the producers so as for high level of δ Go-for-Broke is
more likely to be the optimal strategy in the stage game. In particular,
there exists a threshold δ∗ such that for any δ < δ∗ Going-for-Broke is not
an admissible strategy for the ruler. To show that we need to solve the
following inequality:
b¯(δ) > 1,
that holds for
δ < Ω +
1
2
ln τq +
1
2β
(mt − q) ≡ δ∗.
3.5.4 Proof of Proposition 6
A stable steady state is a point (e∞, γ∞) with the curve χ(γ) cuts the
curve Υ(e) from above. An unstable steady state corresponds in each
case to an intersection from below.
The dynamical system (3.23) reduces to a one-dimensional recursion:
eit+1 = χ(e
i
t,Υ(e
i
t)). It has the following features:
(i)
χ(0) = 0
(ii)
χ′(eit) =
(1− δ)(1− Ω)[
1− Ω
(
1 + (1− κ) eitemt
)]2 ≥ 0 by SOC
(iii)
χ′′(eit) =
(1− δ)(1− Ω)(1− κ)[
1− Ω
(
1 + (1− κ) eitemt
)]3 Ωemt
Given that SOC implies that the numerator is positive, we have that
χ(eit)
{
is convex if eit <
(
1
Ω − 1
)
emt
1−κ
is concave elsewhere
The function χ(eit) therefore presents an asymptotic behavior in
correspondence of eit = (1/Ω − 1)(emt /(1 − κ)); on the left of such
value the function diverges to infinity; on the right it diverges to
−∞. In this last region the function never crosses the horizontal
axis nor the 45 degree line. Accordingly, we constraint the upper
bound of the education support to be e¯ < (1/Ω − 1)(emt /(1 − κ)),
that amounts to exclusively consider the case in which Ω is small
enough (that is the most interesting region for the rising of populist
phenomena).
The steady states are rather computed as follow:
(v)
eit+1 = e
i
t = e∞
in four fixed points:
e(1)∞ = 0
e(2)∞ =

(
δ
Ω − 1
)
em∞
1−κ ≥ 0 iff Ω ≤ δ(
δ
Ω − 1
)
em∞
1−κ ≤ 0 elsewhere
A fixed point e∞ is stable if and only if
dχ(e)
de
∣∣∣
e=e∞
< 1.
Accordingly, it is straightforward to see that, when Ω ≤ δ (or if q ≤
q¯(β, δ, τ) ≡ 12 δβ(1−τ) ), χ(eit) is a convex function that crosses the 45 degree
line from below in correspondence of e(2)∞ which is, in such a way, an
unstable steady state, the unique stable one being e(1)∞ = 0. In the latter
case (Ω(q) ≥ δ), e(2)∞ ≤ 0 is the unique stable fixed point, whereas, inter-
estingly enough, e(1)∞ = 0 is unstable, meaning that each citizen with any
initial condition ei0 > 0 accumulate over time getting richer and richer.
In the former case (Ω(q) ≤ δ), the most interesting in this chapter, rich
citizens with ei0 > (δ/Ω−1)(em0 /(1−κ)) accumulate over time, eventually
getting e¯, whereas poor (and naive) citizens with ei0 < (δ/Ω− 1)(em0 /(1−
κ)) converge to a state of persistent poverty (e(1)∞ = 0). Note further that
if ( δ
Ω
− 1
) em0
1− κ ≥ e
m
0
that is,
δ ≥ Ω(2− κ) ⇐⇒ q ≤ 1
2
δ
β(1− τ)(2− κ)
poor are the majority and nonetheless they converge to a state of poverty
and naivite´ by keeping support to the populist ruler.
e
(2)
∞ depends on the trajectory of the median agent of the distribution,
that is then pivotal. In time 1, from (3.23), is evident that ei1 ≥ ei0 if the
citizen i is rich enough, i.e. if
ei0 ≥
( δ
Ω
− 1
) em0
1− κ
by selecting only good investments to be done in σt = H with respon-
sible rulers. Naive agents instead will be driven by the psychology po-
litical process to carry out any investment including the bad investment
proposed by populist rulers in state L. It leads eventually to a disastrous
result with the poor getting poorer over time. This reasoning implies a
divergence process according to which inequality broadens over time.
To see that note that the dynamics of the system turns into a com-
plex inequality-spreading process described by the following individual
linear law of motion:
et =
(1− δ)t
(1− Ω)t − (1− Ω)t−1Ωei0 − Ω(1− δ)t−2[1 +
∑∞
i=t−1(t− i)(1− Ω)]
em0
which depends on the initial median level of distribution and on the ini-
tial individual level. This second dependence generates inequality in the
long-run distribution.
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Chapter 4
The Italian primary
school-size distribution and
the city-size: a complex
nexus
4.1 Introduction
There is a growing literature that nowadays sheds light on complex-
ity features of social systems. Notable examples are firms and cities
[1, 2, 3, 4], but many others have been proposed [5, 6]. These systems
are perpetually out of balance, where anything can happen within well-
defined statistical laws [7, 8]. Italian schools system seems to not escape
from the same characterization and destiny. Despite several attempts of
the Italian Ministry of education to reduce the class-size to comply with
requirements stated by law [9, 10, 11], no improvements have been made
and still heterogeneity naturally keeps featuring the size distribution of
the Italian primary schools.
In this chapter we characterize the statistical law according to which
the size of the Italian primary schools distributes. Using a database pro-
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vided by the Italian Ministry of education in 2010 we show that the Ital-
ian primary school-size approximately distributes (in terms of students)
as a log-normal distribution, with a fat lower tail that collects a large
number of very small schools. Similarly to the firm-size [13], we also find
the upper tail to decrease exponentially. Moreover, the distribution of
the school growth rates are distributed with a Laplassian PDF. These dis-
tributions are consistent with the Bose-Einstein preferential attachment
process. These results are found both at a provincial level and aggregate
up to a national level, i.e. they are universal and do not depend on the
geographic area.
The body of the distribution features a bimodal shape suggesting
some source of heterogeneity in the school organization. The evidence of
the bimodality underlies the interplay between different processes that
define thresholds and boundaries that are very peculiar for the Italian
primary school-size distribution. The question that we attempt to ad-
dress in this chapter is whether such regularity might depend on the
complex geographic features of the Country that in turn determines the
way population (and in particular young people) distributes. We ad-
dress these questions by analyzing in depth the spatial distribution of
the schools, with particular regard to the areas where commuting is more
effortful. We then proceed by investigating the complex link between
schools and comuni, the smallest administrative centers in Italy, address-
ed by the introduction of a new binning methodology and a new spatial
interaction analysis. Our conclusions indicate that the bimodality of the
Italian primary school-size distribution is very likely to be due to a mix-
ture of two laws governing small schools in the countryside and bigger
ones in the cities, respectively.
Several examples of different regional schooling organizations are an-
alyzed and discussed. We use GPS code positions for schools in two very
different Italian Regions: Abruzzo and Tuscany. We introduce a measure
of the average spatial interaction intensity between a school and the sur-
rounding ones. We show that in regions like Abruzzo, that are mainly
countryside, a policy favoring small schools uniformly distributed across
small comuni has been implemented. Abruzzo small schools are gener-
ally located in low density populated zones, in correspondence of very
small comuni. They are also very likely to have another small school as
closest and the median distance between them is 8 km that is also the
distance between small comuni. In Tuscany, a flatter region with a very
densely populated zone along the metropolitan area composed by Flo-
rence, Pisa and Livorno, we conversely find:
• higher school density;
• stronger interaction between small and big schools;
• greater average proximity among schools.
We address these stylized facts by arguing that the Italian primary school
organization is basically the result of a random process in the school
choice made by the parents. Primary education is not felt so much deter-
minant to drive housing choice, like in US, because of the absence of any
territorial constraint in school choice. Even if there is a certain mobility
within a comune toward the most appealing schools, primary students
generally do not move across comuni to attend a school. As a result,
school density and school-size are prevalently driven by the population
density and then by the geographical features of the territory. This gen-
erates a mixture in the schooling organization that turns into a bimodal
shape distribution.
4.2 Results
Empirical evidence
We analyze a database on the primary school-size distribution in Italy
that provides information on public and private schools, locations, and
the number of classes and students enrolled. Data are collected, at the
beginning of every academic year, by the Italian Ministry of education
to be used for official notices. Our dataset covers N = 17187 primary
schools in 2010 of which 91.31% were public. Almost seven thousands
are located in mountain territories, (which represent the 40%) and 4101
are spread among administrative centers (provincial head-towns).
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Figure 4.1: School-size distribution. a. Italian primary school-size distribution ac-
cording to the number xi of student per school i ∈ [1, . . . , N ] for the year 2010. The
empirical distribution is drawn in blue (each circle is a bin); the red line stands for the
Gaussian fit with mean µˆ = 4.77 (µˆ/ ln(10) = 2.07) and standard deviation σˆ = 0.85
(σˆ/ ln(10) = 0.37). On a non-logarithmic scale, exp(µˆ) = 118 and exp(σˆ) = 2.34.
N = 17187. Statistical errors (SE) are drawn in correspondence of each bin, accord-
ing to
√
Nbin. SE are bigger in the body of the distribution and tinier in the tails.
Nevertheless, central bins space from the two peaks, m1 = 1.7 and m2 = 2.3, at
least 6 times the SE, equals on average to
√
103 = 32. In this case the probability to
have a non bimodal shape under our distribution is 4 × 10−15. b. Italian primary
school-size distribution in log-log scale. As expected, the theoretical distribution has
drawn as a perfect parabola (the red curve), y = ax2 + bx+ c, such that µˆ = −b/2a
and σˆ = −1/2a. Conversely, the empirical distribution does not plot as a parabola, at
least for what regards to the tails which deviate from the log-normal. The inset figure
shows a functional form of the right tail of the empirical distribution. We plot the cu-
mulative distribution, P (X > xi) = exp(−αxi), of school sizes in semi-logarithmic
scale with characteristics size α = 0.0084. This in turn means that there are approxi-
mately 120 students per school.
In Italy primary education is compulsory for children aged from six
to ten. However, the parents are allowed to choose any school which they
prefer, not necessarily the school closest to their home, [14]. We define xi
the size of the school i ∈ [1, . . . , N ] as the number of students enrolled in
each school. Fig. 4.1(a) shows the histogram of the logarithm of the size
of all primary schools in Italy. The red solid curve is the log-normal fit to
the data
P (lnx) = exp
(
− (lnx− µˆ)
2
2σˆ2
)
1√
2piσˆ
(4.1)
using the estimated parameters µˆ = 4.77 (µˆ/ ln(10) = 2.07), the mean of
the lnx of the number of students per school, and its standard deviation,
σˆ = 0.85 (σˆ/ ln(10) = 0.37). On a non-logarithmic scale, exp(µˆ) = 118
and exp(σˆ) = 2.34 are called the location parameter and the scale pa-
rameter, respectively [15]. The histogram in Fig. 4.1a suggests that log-
normal fits data quite well. However, even a quick glance reveals that
there are too many schools with a small dimension and much less mass
in the upper tail with respect to the fit, suggesting that the number of
students of the largest schools is smaller than would be the case for a
true log-normal. In other words, similarly with firms-size distribution
[16], tails seem to distribute differently from the log-normal distribution.
Also Fig. 4.1a reveals a bimodal shape of the school-size distribution that
we will extensively investigate below.
These findings can be detected in a more powerful way by plotting
the histogram in a double logarithmic scale, comparing the tails of the
log-normal distribution with those of the empirical one. We do this in
Fig. 4.1b where y-axes represents the logarithm of the number of schools
in the bins whereas in the x-axes the logarithm of the number of stu-
dents stands. The empirical distribution differs significantly from the
theoretical distribution which is a perfect parabola (the red curve), both
in the tails and in the central bimodal part. A functional form of the
right tail of the empirical distribution is revealed in the inset of Fig. 4.1b
where we plot the cumulative distribution P (X > x) of school sizes in
semi-logarithmic scale. The straight line fit suggests that the right tail
decreases exponentially P (X > x) = exp(−xα) with a characteristics
size α = 1120 . This in turn means that there are approximately 120 stu-
dents per school and also that the distribution of large schools declines
exponentially. The exponential decay of the right tail of size distribution
is consistent with Bose-Einstein preferential attachment process and is
observed in the distribution of sizes of universities and firms.
Next we investigate the growth rates of elementary schools. Since
temporal data are not currently available, we look at the single academic
year, the 2010, and define the growth rate gi as follows:
gi ≡ x
1
i − x5i∑5
j=1 x
j
i
= λi − µi, (4.2)
where xji stands for the number of students attending the j-th grade in
school i, with j ∈ [1, 5]; λi ≡ x1i /
∑5
j=1 x
j
i is the fraction of students
that have been enrolled in the first grade at six years old in school i,
whereas µi ≡ x5i /
∑5
j=1 x
j
i is the fraction of students that exit the school
after the 5-th grade. Fig. 4.2a shows the relation between growth rate
gi and school-size xi. The numbers of grades j provided by each school
i, named Ji, is defined by the color gradient bar on the right side of the
Fig. 4.2a. Blue circles identify schools with Ji = 1. Such a group collects
schools just established only providing the 1-st grade, i.e. with λi = 1
and µi = 0, or that are going to close providing only the 5-th grade, i.e.
with µi = 1 and λi = 0. As soon as more grades are provided (colors
switching to the warm side of the bar) schools tend to cluster around a
null growth rate.
In Fig. 4.2b we investigate the growth/size relationship in depth.
We demonstrate the applicability of the Gibrat law that states that the
average growth rate is independent on the size [17, 18]. We define the
average of the school size in each bin c as 〈xi〉c. The number of school in
each bin nc is represented by the size of the circle and the average number
of grades 〈Ji〉c is depicted according to the color gradient on the right
side (the same of Fig. 4.2a). Independently from the size and the number
of grades provided, schools do not grow on average. Nevertheless, we
find more variability in smaller schools, apart from schools with xi < 10,
namely hospital-based schools mostly similar to one another, and the
standard deviation of the growth rate σg(〈xi〉c) is found to be decreasing
as 〈xi〉−βc with school-size by a rate of β ≈ .60 (subFig. 4.2b inset). This
is consistent with what has been found for other complex systems like
firms or cities [13, 20, 21, 22, 23].
In Fig. 4.3a we study the growth rate distribution, where the prob-
ability density function P (g = gi) of growth rate has been plotted. The
blue line represents the full sample (all the schools) distribution. Black
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Figure 4.2: The growth rate and school-size relationship. The growth rate gi is
defined according to Eq. (4.2). a. Colors, according to the vertical bar on the right-
hand side of the graph, are the number of grades Ji provided by the school i. Smaller
schools (in blue) with Ji = 1 are both the newest one (just created, with λ = 1) and
schools that are going to close (with µ = 1). They can also be schools that do not grow
yet providing just one grade (i.e. j = 3). b. The mean growth rate clusters around
zero across different subsets c that are differently populated by nc schools according
to the size of the circles. The color of the circles stand for the average number of
grades Ji (the same gradient color bar of Fig. 2(a) is used here). The variability
within each cluster c is shown in the inset figure. Apart from schools with xi < 10,
namely hospital-based schools mostly similar to one another, the standard deviation
is found to be decreasing with school-size by a rate of β ≈ .60.
and red colors identify the full capacity schools (Ji = 5) and the schools
with Ji < 5, respectively. Regardless of the number of grades provided,
the growth distribution underlines a Laplace PDF in the central part of
the sample [24]. The not-fully covered schools show a three peak behav-
ior, where the left peak represents schools which are going to close, the
central peak gathers schools that provide several grades but still in equi-
librium phase, and the right peak is made up by the growing schools.
Fig. 4.3b reports empirical tests for the tails of the PDF of the growth rate
of the full sample (the upper one in blue, and the lower one in black).
The asymptotic behavior of g can be well approximated by power laws
with exponents ζ ≈ 4 (the magenta dashed line), bringing support to the
hypothesis of a stable dynamics of the process [20]. All these findings are
consistent with the Bose-Einstein process according to which the size dis-
tribution has an exponential right tail, a tent-shaped distributed growth
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Figure 4.3: The growth rate distribution of the Italian primary schools in 2010. a.
The probability density function P (g = gi) of growth rate has been plotted underly-
ing a Laplace PDF in the body around P (g) = 1 and P (g) ≈ 10−1.5. Blue triangles
(4) stand for the full sample distribution, black circles (◦) indicate mature schools
with Ji = 5, and red stars (∗) schools with Ji = 1. b. The plot reports empirical tests
for the tails parts of the PDF of growth rate, the upper one in blue (◦), and the lower
one in black (). The asymptotic behavior of g can be well approximated by power
laws with exponents ζ ≈ 4 (the magenta dashed line).
rate gi, with a Laplace cap and power law tails, the average growth rate
is independent of the size, and the size-variance relationship is governed
by the power law behavior with exponent β ≈ 0.5 [25].
4.2.1 City size and school size
Fig. 4.1a features the coexistence of two peaks, the first peak correspond-
ing to log10 xi ≡ m1 = 1.7 and the second one to log10 xi ≡ m2 = 2.3,
divided by a splitting point in correspondence of log10 xi ≡ m¯ ≈ 2.1.
The school sizes corresponding to these features are µ1 = 10m1 = 50,
µ2 = 10
m2 = 200, and µ¯ = 10m¯ = 128, with µ¯ approximately equal to
the average school size. 39% of the Italian primary schools distribute on
the right of µ¯, and more than 60% distribute on the left side. We test the
alternative hypothesis of unimodality by looking at the probability that
the numbers of schools in the two central bins n1, n2 are not smaller and
the numbers of schools in the next three bins n3, n4, n5 are not larger than
a certain number n∗ provided that the standard deviation of the number
of schools in these bins due to small statistics is
√
n∗. This probability
is equal to p(n∗) =
∏
i erfc(|ni − n∗|/
√
2n∗)/2 and it reaches maximum
pmax ≈ 4 × 10−15 at n∗ = 980. Accordingly, we establish the bimodality
with a very high confidence. This is also consistent with the bimodality
index that we find to be equal to δ = (µ1 − µ2)/σ = .45, [26].
In this section we investigate the source of this heterogeneity that we
find to be related to geographical and political features of the country and
remarkably to the size of the comuni, the smallest administrative centers
in Italy (information on comuni are provided by the Italian statistical in-
stitute, ISTAT), also here referred interchangeably as cities regardless of
the size, pk. A particular treatment is devoted to the nexus between the
school-type (private versus public) and the geographical features of the
comuni in the supplementary information, where we show that private
schools are much less variable in size than public schools and have a nar-
row unimodal distribution peaked at approximately 100 students which
contributes to the left peak of the entire school size distribution (Figure
4.14).
We denote a comune with letter k = [1, . . . ,K]. In 2010,K = 8, 092 co-
muni have been counted in Italy, the 40% of which located in the moun-
tains. We define M the set of mountains comuni and, accordingly, we
call school i a mountain school iff it resides in a comune k ∈ M (in the
sec. 4.5 we explain the mechanism according to which Italian comuni are
classified as mountains). Each city k has nk ≥ 0 schools (more than 15%
of the cities have no schools) and population pk, which distributes ap-
proximately as a log-normal PDF (see Fig. 4.4a), except for the right tail
that is distributed according to a Zipf law, i.e. pk ∼ r(pk)−ξ with slope
ξ ≈ 1 [2, 3, 27, 28, 29]. In Fig. 4.4b we find ξ ≈ .80, in Italy, that is exactly
the slope of the power law pk ∼ r(nk)−ζ which links the population pk
with the rank of this city in terms of number of schools nk (blue circles
in Fig. 4.4b), i.e. ζ = ξ ≈ .80. This means that the first city, Rome, has
almost the double number of schools than Milan, and triple of Naples,
while Rome has almost the double of inhabitants of Milan, and the triple
of Naples. This amounts to say that nk is a good proxy for the city-size.
We use the number of schools to assign comuni to different clusters
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Figure 4.4: Cities features. a. The Italian city-size distribution for K = 8092
observations. Blue circles stand for each city-bin whereas the red solid line draws
the log-normal fit of the data. Conversely to the school-size distribution depicted in
Fig. 4.1a, the city-size PDF features single-peakedness, but similarly it has a power-
law decay in the upper tail. b. Zipf plot for Italian cities according to the size pk
and the number of schools nk . The black line draws the classical Zipf plot pk ∼
r(pk)
−ξ , with cities ranked according to population pk . Blue circles instead depict
the Zipf plot pk ∼ r(nk)−ζ , with cities ranked according to the number of schools
nk . Consequently, the sample reduces toM = 6726 overN = 8092 since more of the
15% of the cities have no schools.
h ∈ [1, . . . ,H], according to
h = {∀ k ∈ [1, . . . ,K] : 2h−1 ≤ nk < 2h}. (4.3)
Accordingly, the first bin h = 1 gathers all the comuni with only one
school; the second one collects all the comuni with nk = [2, 3], and so on.
Though we find the average population 〈p〉h to increase across different
city-clusters h, less comuni Kh lie in more populated clusters (the ma-
genta and black lines in Fig. 4.5a). Interestingly, we find the interaction
term Kh〈p〉h, the green line in Fig. 4.5a, to distribute uniformly across
different comuni-clusters, meaning that in small comuni with nk = 1
live the same population than in bigger ones with much more schools.
Nevertheless, population is differently composed across city-clusters
and a smaller fraction of young people is found in smaller comuni. To
see that we also introduce a clusterization of comuni according to popu-
lation. Each comune is assigned to a cluster c ∈ [1, . . . , C] composed by
102 103 104 105 106 107
10−2
100
102
104
106
pc
 
 
⟨x⟩c ≈ 230
β ≈ 1
β ≈ .88
⟨x⟩c
⟨n ⟩c
s˜ c= ⟨x⟩c ∗ ⟨n ⟩c
a)
100 101 102
102
104
106
nh
 
 
⟨p⟩h
Kh
Kh ∗ ⟨p⟩h
b)
Figure 4.5: Population features. a. Each comune is assigned to 8 clusters, according
to Eq. 4.3, and scattered against population, the magenta line (◦) and the number of
cities Kh, the black line (). The interaction term, Kh ∗ 〈p〉h, the green line (4),
represents the total population living in each city-cluster h. b. According to Eq. 4.4
K cities are assigned to C = 16 clusters. In the x-axis the number of inhabitants
in cluster c = {7, 22} is scattered against the average number of schools (magenta
line (4)) and the average school-size 〈x〉c (the black line ()). The interaction term
(◦), representing the typical number of schooling-aged population in cluster c, s˜c =
〈x〉c ∗ 〈n〉c distributes as a power law with coefficient β ≈ 1 for cities bigger than
103 inhabitants, and it is drawn in green. For smaller comuni, instead, the line drops
meaning that a smaller fraction of young people features them.
all the comuni k with population pk ranging from ψc−1 to ψc, i.e.
c = {∀ k ∈ [1, . . . ,K] : ψc−1 < pk ≤ ψc}. (4.4)
Setting the parameter1 ψ = 2 yields C = 23 clusters. Although the first
seven sets are empty because no comuni in Italy has less than 128 inhab-
itants, the first (non-empty) cluster, c = 8, collects very small comuni
with pk ∈ (128, 256]. The last one, c = 23, conversely, is composed by the
biggest cities with pk ∈ (222, 223]. In Fig. 4.5b we plot the average number
of schools 〈n〉c (magenta line) and the average school-size 〈x〉c (the blue
line) against the comuni size pc for each non-empty cluster c. We find
that the average number of schools increases as a power law with coef-
ficient β = 0.88. This is consistent with the literature [2, 3, 28, 29] that
1It is possible to change the value of ψ without having any effect on the shape of the
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Figure 4.6: City vs. number schools. School-size distribution for different city-
samples clustered according to the number of schools, i.e. to Eq. 4.3. Only comuni
with nk = 1 show a single peak school-size distribution, clustered around m1 (the
+-red line on the top). They have an average population of 2000 inhabitants and the
81% are located in mountain territories.
has stressed the emergence of scale-invariant laws that characterize the
city-size distribution. The average school-size increases with the popu-
lation of the city reaching an asymptotic value at 〈x〉c ' 230 students per
school in the large cities. As expected, the interaction term, representing
the average number of school-aged population in comuni belonging to
cluster c, s˜c = 〈x〉c ∗ 〈n〉c, behaves linearly with the comuni size except
for small comuni with pc < 103, for which the school-aged population
constitutes a smaller fraction of the total population than in large cities.
In Fig. 4.6-4.7 we investigate the school-size distribution according
to the comuni features. To this end, Fig. 4.6 draws the distributions of
log10 xi conditionally on the number of schools, nk, in the comune k.
It yields 8 curves, one for each cluster h defined in Eq. 4.3. The first
cluster is drawn in red (+) distributing all the schools located in comuni
where only one school is provided. The orange line (◦) distributes all
the schools provided in comuni with two or three schools (i.e. h = 2);
and so on. The interesting point of Fig. 4.6 is that only the school-size
distribution of the smallest comuni (with nk = 1) features a unimodal
distributions
shape. The reason for that relies on the fact that comuni with only one
school are geographically similar: they are the 57% of the total, with little
more than 2000 inhabitants, the 81% of which are located in mountain
territories.
The relationship between school-size and altitude is investigated in
Fig. 4.7a. Instead of conditioning on M, here we propose a more con-
sistent exercise according to which comuni are assigned to different bins
on the basis of the altitude. In such a way, we can analyze comuni with
1,000 meters above the sea differently to those with 600 meters of altitude
that would be gathered in the same clusterM throwing away informa-
tive heterogeneity. It yields 5 bins: the first bin (drawn as a blue + line)
gathers all the comuni whose altitude is lower than 125 meters above the
see level (labeled 125 in Fig. 4.7a). Comuni with an altitude between 125
and 250 meters above the sea level composed the second bin (the green
◦ line). These two distributions cluster around the second mode m2 and
in the Supplementary Information we additionally demonstrate that the
hypothesis of bimodality can be rejected for the latter distribution. How-
ever, the greater the altitude of the comuni the greater is the shift of the
correspnding school-size distribution toward the small schools and the
greater is the contribution of these comuni to the first mode m1. Such
a shift becomes evident for comuni with an altitude between 250m and
500m (red 4 line). Comuni located between 500m and 1000m (cyan ×
line) and above 1000m (purple  line) clusterize around m1.
Even the largest cities are very different from each other in terms
of their school size distribution. This heterogeneity is very likely to be
driven by geographical features. where we restrict our interest on the
largest Italian cities belonging to cluster h = 8 (and to the first two bins
in terms of altitude in Fig. 4.7a). These cities provide a number of schools
nk between 127 and 255, whose overall size distribution shows a three-
peak shape with a third peak around 300 students absent in smaller cities
(the bottom violet 4 line in Fig. 4.6). The presence of the three peaks
around 100, 200 and 300 students might suggest the presence of archi-
tectural standards of school buildings supporting these particular sizes.
However, by plotting the distribution by city, Fig. 4.7b, we show that
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Figure 4.7: School-size distribution conditional on comuni features. a. School-
size distribution for different city-samples clustered according to the altitude. The
altitude of the comune shift the school-size distribution (shift location effect) as higher
comuni are generally smaller schools. b. School-size distribution in the six biggest
Italian cities. With the exception of Rome, the hypothesis of unimodality may not be
rejected in none of the biggest cities. In particular, flatter cities, such as Milano and
Torino, mostly contribute to second mode m2, whereas in Genova, Italian city built
upon mountains that steeply ended on the sea, all the school-size distribution stands
on the left side.
all the traces of trimodality disappear. In particular flatter cities, such
as Milano and Torino, mostly contribute to second mode m2, whereas in
Genova, an Italian city built upon mountains that steeply slope towards
the sea, the school-size distribution is unimodal contributing mostly to
the first mode m1.
Another way to look at the effect of geography on the comunal school-
size is to compute the fraction of large schools on the total within each
comune k:
Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k) ≡ nk(xi > µ¯)
nk
∀ i ∈ k, (4.5)
where nk(xi > µ¯) stands for the number of schools that, in each comune
k, are larger than the minimum µ¯ of the school-size distribution shown in
Fig. 4.1a. It can also be interpreted as the contribution rate of a comune
k to the second mode m2. The upper panel of Fig. 4.8 diagrammatically
explains how Pk(·) is computed.
We firstly study the relationship between Pk(·) and population, then
looking at the spatial distribution across the Italy. In Fig. 4.8, we clus-
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Figure 4.8: Fraction of large schools in comune k. The panel above shows the pro-
cess according to which each comune, with population pk defined by the size of the
the black circles, is assigned to either patterns on the basis of the size of the schools
provided in there (the small blue circles). The panel below shows that more popu-
lated clusters of cities are, on average, more likely to have schools sized around m2.
The relationship, depicted in blue, is however non monotonic. In correspondence of
each bin h, the standard deviations has been computed, underlining the outstanding
variability in very small cities (the green line).
terize comuni according to Eq. 4.3, and for each bin h we compute the
average 〈Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k)〉h and population 〈pk〉h. Interestingly, the
plot shows that Pk(·) does not increase monotonically with population,
demonstrating the existence of two city-patterns. More precisely, cities
with less than 104 inhabitants follow a pattern according to which the
fraction of big schools, with xi > µ¯, increases, on average, with popula-
tion at a rate of β1 ≈ .22; in cities with more than 105 we find the effect
of population to be smaller, corresponding to β2 ≈ .15. For the cities
with population between 104 and 105, the fraction of large schools does
not increase with size suggesting that exogenous shocks such as altitude,
Figure 4.9: Spatial distribution of cities according to Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k). Warmer
territories stand for cities more likely of having schools distributed around m2. The
two figure inset underline the region around Milan (in the North), on the top, and the
regions of Basilicata (mostly mountain, at the left side) and of Apulia (mostly flat, at
the right side), on the bottom. Maps generated with Matlab.
rugged terrain and age might shift a city in this transition zone to either
mode m1 or mode m2.
Overall, the distribution of Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k) is strongly correlated
with the geographical features of the comuni territory. The map in Fig.
4.9 clarifies this point; all the mountain territories, Apennines that repre-
sent the spine of the peninsula and the Alps on the northern side, turns to
be comuni with small schools, since the share of small schools in moun-
tain comuni is equal to P (xi ≤ µ¯|k ∈ M) = 0.72. As soon as the proba-
bility to contribute to m2 increases the colors get warmer; but this is very
unlikely to be in mountain territories, because less than 30% of moun-
tain comuni contribute to the antimode. Some regional patterns are also
shown in the insets. The first upper panel depicts the area around Milan,
which is surrounded by warm colors that mostly dye the Pianura Padana
around. On the south side, Apennines approach and colors get blue with
a lot of comuni with no schools (depicted in white). This pattern is more
evident in the lower panel, which maps the region of Apulia, flat and
mostly red, and the Basilicata on the left side, mountainous and mostly
blue colored.
4.2.2 Countryside versus dense regions
In this last section, we bring more evidence on the effect of geography
and comuni organization on the school-size by restricting our attention
at two Italian regions: Abruzzo and Tuscany. But same results stand by
looking at regions with the same geographical features. The two regions
have very peculiar and representative geographical and administrative
characteristics. Abruzzo is a mostly mountain region with a little flat
seaside; it has four main head towns divided from each other by moun-
tains. Conversely, Tuscany has many flat zones in the center and the
mountain areas shape the region boundaries. Remarkably, it has a very
high densely populated zone along the metropolitan area composed by
Florence, Pisa and Livorno.
These two regions also differ in terms of administrative organiza-
tions, Abruzzo favoring the establishment of comuni with a smaller size
due to the presence of mountains. Fig. 4.10 shows the comuni popula-
tion distributions in Tuscany and Abruzzo. We clusterize comuni using
the algorithm in Eq. 4.4. As Fig. 4.10a makes clear, comuni distribute
approximately as a log-normal pdf in both regions, i.e. as a parabola in
a log-log scale (the green-◦ line stands for Abruzzo pdf, the magenta-4
for Tuscany). Nevertheless, Tuscany has bigger cities. Figure 4.10a also
shows the average number of schools as function of the population. The
fact that 〈nK〉 is less than one for small comuni reflects the fact that many
of these comuni do not provide schools. Abruzzo has a larger number of
small comuni that do not provide schools. The first bin collects comuni
with a bit more than 100 inhabitants. They are 7 in Abruzzo (none in Tus-
cany), none of them providing any school services. The second bin accu-
mulates 10 comuni in Abruzzo with 300 inhabitants (none in Tuscany), of
which only one has a school. Comuni with about 600 inhabitants are 40
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Figure 4.10: Regional analysis I. a. The figure distributes the city-size in Abruzzo
(◦-green) and Tuscany (4-magenta) by plotting the number of comuni, Kc, against
the number of inhabitants, pc. Also shown is the average number of schools in a co-
mune in Abruzzo and Tuscany, belonging to a bin c defined by Eq. 4.4, by the circled-
and triangled-connected lines respectively. b. School-size distribution in Abruzzo
(◦-green) and Tuscany (4-magenta). Both pdf are approximately lognormal and bi-
modal with splitting point equal to 128 and 151 students per school respectively.
in Abruzzo and only 7 in Tuscany. Only 30% of them have one school in
Abruzzo while 80% of them have at least one school in Tuscany. Overall,
there are 53 comuni in Abruzzo without schools; only 3 in Tuscany.
Such a differences reflects on the school-size distribution, depicted in
Fig. 4.10b. Although primary schools distribute in both regions in terms
of size with two peaks, both Abruzzo m1 and m2 are shifted on the left
w.r.t. the Tuscany ones. The average school-size is smaller in Abruzzo
(µˆABR = 4.56 (µˆABR/ ln(10) = 1.98) versus µˆTOS = 4.91 (µˆTOS/ ln(10) =
2.13)), and, remarkably, the lower tail is fatter in the former region. The
cutoff for splitting the mixed distributions amounts to 128 in Abruzzo
and 151 in Tuscany, and 31% of the schools are clustered in the second
peak in the former region; P (xi > µ¯TOS |∀ i ∈ TOS) = 0.38 in the latter.
In Fig. 4.11a we show, following the same clustering technique used
in Fig. 4.8, that in both regions the fraction of big schools within comune
k, Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k), increases monotonically with respect to the number
of inhabitants for 〈pk〉h < 20000.
In this interval, a comparison with figures for entire Italy, plotted in
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Figure 4.11: Regional analysis II. a. Average fraction of big schools in each co-
muni bin, defined by Eq. 4.3, in Abruzzo (◦-green) and Tuscany 4-magenta). The
plot shows that more populated comuni are, on average, more likely to have schools
sized aroundm2, in both regions. Yet, in mountain regions, such as Abruzzo, smaller
comuni have also smaller schools on average. b. The conditional probability is plot-
ted in the y-axis, for an arbitrary school size x∗, as function of x∗ against the cumula-
tive probability P (xi ≤ x∗). The conditional probability is equal to the cumulative in
correspondence of the black line. Along these points, there is no attraction between
schools of the same size. This is not the case in both the two regions.
Fig. 4.8, reveals that both regions follow the same national pattern. Yet,
mountain regions, such as Abruzzo, have a significantly smaller concen-
tration of big schools. In particular in Abruzzo, only about 1/10 of co-
muni with just one school, with an average population of roughly 2000,
have a school with more than 125 students. In Tuscany, they are the 25%,
about the same as national ratio. In larger comuni, with an average popu-
lation of 5000 and two schools provided (the second bin), the probability
of having big schools raises to 0.2 in Abruzzo, still smaller than Tuscany
where 〈Pk(xi > µ¯|∀ i ∈ k)〉h=2 = 0.3.
Small schools are mainly located in the countryside, and for that rea-
son they cluster together, i.e. it is more likely to find a small school near
a small one. In Abruzzo this clustering effect is stronger than in Tus-
cany. We investigate this point in Fig. 4.11b, where we compute, and
plot on the x-axis, the cumulative probability P (xi ≤ x∗), as function of
x∗, and the correspondent conditional probability P (xt ≤ x∗|xi ≤ x∗), on
the y-axis, which is the fraction of schools with the size smaller than x∗
among the schools closest to a school of size x∗. This quantity is equal to
74% and 65% for x∗ ≡ µ¯reg in Abruzzo and Tuscany respectively, mean-
ing that there is a greater probability that a small school matches with
another of the same kind in the former region. If the conditional proba-
bility were equal to the cumulative, as indicated by the black line in Fig.
4.11b, the sizes of neighboring schools would be independent. This is not
the case in either the two regions. The probability that a small school has
a smaller nearest neighbor is larger than the probability that any school
is smaller than a given one. Indeed, the two curves (green for Abruzzo
and magenta for Tuscany) are significantly above the 45 degree line for
P (xi < x
∗) < 0.6 in Tuscany and for P (xi < x∗) < 0.7 in Abruzzo. These
probability values roughly correspond to the probabilities P (xi < µ¯) in
respectively Tuscany and Abruzzo, indicating that in both regions small
schools are likely to belong to the small mountainous comuni, whose
nearest neighbors are of the same class.
We further study the attraction intensity among small schools by dis-
entangling the effect between the countryside and dense zones. To this
end, we analyze the GPS location of the schools in the two regions and,
for each school i, we compute the number of schools nim belonging wi-
thin a circle of radius rm centered at each school j. We exclude from nim
all the schools which do not belong to Tuscany or Abruzzo, respectively.
To eliminate the effect of region’s boundaries, we also compute areas
Djm as the areas of the intersections of these circles with a given region
(Abruzzo or Tuscany). Thus Dim ≤ pi(rim)2, because these areas do not
include the seaside and administrative territories of other regions. The
difference between two subsequent circles yields the area of the annulus
Aim = D
i
m−Dim−1. The density of schools in the area Aim is then defined
as:
ρim =
nim − nim−1
Aim
, (4.6)
and the average density of schools as function of a distance to a randomly
selected school is
〈ρm〉i =
∑
N n
i
i −
∑
N n
i
m−1∑
N A
i
m
. (4.7)
In Fig. 4.12a red lines represent the average school-density around
all the schools in Tuscany and Abruzzo, which are 472 in the former and
1037 in the latter region. Green lines describe the average school den-
sity around a small school with xi ≤ µ¯, named S1, whereas the blue
lines describe the density around large schools, S2. 64% of the schools in
Abruzzo belong to the S1 group, 53% in Tuscany. Fig. 4.12a collects evi-
dence about the fact that small schools S1 are located in low school den-
sity zones and, accordingly, have a smaller probability to be surrounded
by competitor schools than large schools (S2) located in densely popu-
lated areas. In both regions, in fact, the green line goes under the blue
one, for at least first 50km. In particular, within this distance, in Abruzzo
the density stays almost constant at approximately 0.053 meaning that 1
school is provided every 20km2. In Tuscany, this figure goes up to 0.07,
because of a generally higher population density, but yet small.
The correlation coefficients between the school size and the distance
to it nearest neighbor are negative in both regions, but the magnitude is
quite different, equal to 0.34 in Abruzzo, that is 1.7 times greater than in
Tuscany (0.20). To reduce the noise, we proceed by clusterizing schools
according to their size. Fig. 4.12b confirms this pattern by showing that
small schools have on average more distant nearest schools. We look at
the size of each school in both regions, and we define the geodesic eu-
clidean distance between the school i and its nearest neighboring school
(which we denote by subscript t) as d(xi, xt). The binning algorithm used
is to base 2:
l = {∀ i ∈ [1, . . . , N ] : 2l−1 ≤ xi < 2l}. (4.8)
This clusterization yields 8 bins, with different average sizes plotted on
the x-axis of Fig. 4.12b. On the y-axis, we plot the average distance be-
tween the school i, that belongs to the bin l, and its nearest, i.e. 〈d(xi, xt)〉l.
Each school-bin l is depicted by green circles for Abruzzo and magenta
triangles for Tuscany. The average distance between the closest schools
decreases with respect to the average school size 〈xi〉l for 〈xi〉l > 32 in
both regions meaning that, in general, small schools are sparser than
large schools that are more likely to be located in very dense zones, like
cities. The non-monotonic behavior of this quantity for 〈xi〉l < 32 in
Tuscany can be explained by the fact that such small schools in Tuscany
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Figure 4.12: Regional spatial analysis. a. 〈ρm〉i has been plotted, based on Eq.
4.6, and 4.7, for the region of Abruzzo () and Tuscany (4). The red line draws
the trajectory averaging among all the schools in Italy. Green and blue lines stand
for small schools, i.e. xi ≤ µ¯, called S1, and big schools, i.e. xi > µ¯, called S2,
respectively. b. The average distance, in km, between the closest schools, 〈d(xi, xt)〉l,
is plotted in Abruzzo (◦-green) and Tuscany (4-magenta) with respect to the average
size, 〈xi〉l. Each cluster l has been obtained by aggregating schools with near size
according to Eq. 4.8. In Tuscany, the schools provided in small islands, at least 20km
far from the coast, have been removed in order to eliminate any artificial bias from
the spatial analysis, whereas the 18% of the schools, with no address provided in the
MIUR dataset, have been geocoded in Tuscany according to the GPS localization of
the city hall of the comune in which they stand. The average distance between the
closest schools decreases in both regions with respect to the average size meaning
that, in general, small schools are sparser than large schools that are more likely to be
located in very dense zones, like cities.
are usually hospital schools which are located in densely populated ar-
eas. Whereas the schools provided in small islands, at least 20km far
from the coast, have been removed in order to eliminate any artificial
bias from the spatial analysis. The three first magenta bins are all below
the green ones, confirming, in accordance with the geographical features
of the two regions, that in Abruzzo small schools are sparser and more
likely to be located in the countryside where the school density is low
(see Fig. 4.12a). Moreover, small schools on average have a distance to
the nearest neighbor of 4− 5km which is the average distance between a
small comune and a more school-dense one (see the Methods section).
The two regions then outline very different patterns of the school
system in the countryside. In Abruzzo small schools are uniformly dis-
tributed across small comuni, as a result of a policy favoring the dis-
aggregation of the comuni and school organization, due to a tight ge-
ographical constraint. In Tuscany, instead, a different system has been
implemented, according to geographic features and a higher population
density, where small comuni are larger and do not necessarily have small
schools, especially if they stand in very populated zones.
4.3 Discussion
We have studied the main features of the size distribution of the Italian
primary schools, including the sources of the bimodality, and we have
investigated its relation to the characteristics of the Italian cities. The fat
left tail of the distribution is the consequences of political decisions to
provide small schools in small (mostly countryside) comuni, instead of
increasing the efficiency of public transportations. This is most probably
caused by the topographical features of the hilly terrain making trans-
portation of students dangerous and costly. The evidence of this conclu-
sions is that hilly cities like Palermo, Napoli, an, above all, Genoa, with
steep mountains that end up into the sea, have higher fraction of small
schools than mainly flat cities like Torino and Milano.
The analysis of schools growth rates highlights that the schools dy-
namics follows the Gibrat law, and both the growth rate distribution and
the size distribution are consistent with a Bose-Einstein process. Alter-
natively, the exponential decay of the upper tail can be explained by a
constraint by the size of the building or a traveling distance and trans-
portation cost.
Despite our results are conducted using data on Italian primary
schools, they predict that schooling organization would be different in
another country with different geographical features. Flat territory would
lead to open schools in the main villages allowing the children residing in
the smallest ones to travel daily. This result is additionally supported by
the fact that no territorial constraint has been imposed to the schooling
choice. Despite parents can enroll children in the most preferred school,
primary students generally do not move across comuni to attend a school.
Accordingly, we find that school density and school-size are prevalently
driven by the population density and then by the geographical features
of the territory, as a result of a random process in the school choice made
by the parents. This goes in the opposite direction with what has been
found in other countries such as USA where school choices influence res-
idential preferences of parents and drive the real estate prices in town-
ships depending on the quality of their schools [30].
The availability of new longitudinal school data will be relevant to a
more in-depth analysis and further discussions. Moreover, the availabil-
ity of data for other similar countries would favor comparison and would
be useful to assert our theory. We believe that this study, and future re-
search, can lead to a higher level of understanding of these phenomena
and can be useful for a more effective policy making.
4.4 Methods
In this section we propose a novel algorithm for the analysis of spatial
distribution of primary schools in entire Italy. This algorithm is needed if
the exact coordinates of individual schools are not available, but instead,
the centers and the territories of all the comuni are known. For each co-
mune k, we define a gravity center gk of its territory corresponding to
the GPS location of its city hall, and tk as the area of the comune admin-
istration. In Italy the city hall is located in the center of the densely pop-
ulated part of the administrative division, in order to be easily reachable
by the majority of inhabitants. We develop a novel spatial-geographical
approach consisting of a sequence of geographic regions bounded by
two concentric circles, that we exemplified in Fig. 4.13a for a comune in
Abruzzo. First we define a set Zkm of comuni whose city halls are within
a circle of radius rkm and the center at the city hall of comune k. Formally,
Zkm = {∀ j ∈ [1, ..,K] : d(gk, gi) ≤ rkm}. (4.9)
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Figure 4.13: Spatial analysis. a. Graphical example for a small comune in Abruzzo
of the algorithm used in Fig. 4.13b, based on the Eq. 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13. Different
comuni are colored according to the annulus in which they belong. b. 〈ρm〉k has been
plotted for a radius rkm of length 103 across Italy. The red line draws the trajectory
averaging among all the cities in Italy. Green and blue lines stand for cities with
probability Pk(xi > µ¯|∀i ∈ k) ≤ 1/2, labeled M1, and Pk(xi > µ¯|∀i ∈ k) > 1/2,
labeled M2, respectively. Maps generated with Matlab.
Next we compute the number of schools provided by the comuni which
are members of set Zkm that is defined by
nkm =
∑
j∈Zkm
nj (4.10)
and their area
Dkm =
∑
j∈Zkm
tj , (4.11)
where tj is the area of comuni j. Next we compute the area associated
with all the comuni in the m-th concentric annulus surrounding comune
k as the difference between the area associated with the larger circle m
of radius rkm and the area associated with the smaller circle m − 1 of
radius rkm−1, i.e. Akm = Dkm −Dkm−1. In Fig. 4.13a, each comune territory
is colored with different colors according to the annulus in which they
belong.
The density of schools in the area Akm is then defined as:
ρkm =
nkm − nkm−1
Akm
(4.12)
Then we compute the average density of schools around any school in
Italy as:
〈ρm〉k =
∑
K n
k
m −
∑
K n
k
m−1∑
K A
k
m
(4.13)
In Fig. 4.13b, we plot 〈ρm〉k averaged over all the K = 8092 Italian
comuni as a function of the radius rm that goes up to 103 Km across the
entire Italy. The red line represents the average school-density among all
the cities in Italy. On average, Italian comuni stand within very dense
zones providing almost 1 school per 10km2. The dense zones generally
last for 10km and, after that, a smoothed depletion zone is experienced.
However, the average distance between a comune k and a very large city
with many schools is about 100km, accordingly we see a second peak in
the average school density at distance 100km.
The full sample analysis basically averages heterogeneous charac-
teristics that feature different types of comuni. The interaction among
schools can be better understood by splitting the sample according to
Pk(xi > µ¯|∀i ∈ k). In Fig. 4.13b, comuni with Pk(xi > µ¯|∀i ∈ k) ≤ 1/2,
i.e. with predominantly small schools, are named M1. The others, with
predominantly big schools, are called M2.
• M2-comuni, the blue line, are (on average) more likely to be sur-
rounded by school-dense cities. They are cities located in densely
populated areas (depicted in red in Fig. 4.9) where the school den-
sity is large (1.3 schools stand on average within 10km2). As far as
the distance increases mountainous areas (and hence M1-comuni)
are encountered and, as a result, the density of schools is found to
dramatically decrease.
• The green line describes instead cities labeled M1 where a smaller
school density is found. Within 10km, in fact, almost 1 school ev-
ery 20km2 are encountered on average, about the half of what we
find for the M2-comuni. This is because M1-comuni mainly stand
along the countryside (those depicted in blue in Fig. 4.9) where
school density slowly increases with distance and reach a maxi-
mum at approximately 40km, which can be interpreted as a typical
distance to a densely populated area in a neighboring mountain
valley. After this distance the density of schools around M1 and
M2 comuni behave approximately in the same way.
4.5 Supplementary Information
4.5.1 Italian private primary schools versus public primary
schools: a comparison.
In this chapter we addressed the source of the bimodality by consider-
ing all the Italian primary schools. Here we focus on the potential ef-
fect of school type on the school-size distribution. Our dataset collects
N = 17, 187 primary schools in Italy. The fraction of private schools was
always low during the past century. In Italy only the 9% of the total of
primary school are private.
The main source of primary school privatization within the coun-
try is religion. Most of the private schools are venues where education
is strictly connected with the Catholic confession. Among the private
schools more than 73% are of Catholic inspiration. Straightforward his-
torical roots are expected to explain the location of the Italian Catholic
private schools and only marginal are the geographical reasons: private
schools are in fact only the 6.54% of the mountain schools.
We defineM the set of comuni k that are in mountains that, according
to the Law n. 991/1952, are those that have at least the 80% of their ter-
ritories above the 600 meters above the sea and an altitude gap between
the higher and the lower point not least than 600 meters. Each comune k
has nk schools and a fraction of private schools in this comune defined as
P (i ∈ P|∀i ∈ k) ≡ ηk, where i is the school ID. We also define the school-
size of a private school i that resides in a mountain comune as xi∈P,M.
Analogously, xi∈P¯,M¯ stands for the size of a public school residing in a
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Figure 4.14: a. Italian primary school-size distribution disentangled by school type
(private, P , versus public, P¯) and geography (mountain,M, versus non-mountain,
M¯). b. Italian primary school-size distribution by school-type. The blue pattern
replicates Fig. 4.1a.
non-mountain comune.
Figure 4.14a shows that neither private mountain schools (P,M) nor
private schools that reside in flat territories (P,M¯) seem to contribute
significantly to the left tail of the school-size distribution. Both the (◦)
blue and the () black lines, respectively, depict two relatively narrow
school-size distributions around 100 students per school, the (+) green
(P¯,M¯) and the () red lines (P¯,M). In accordance with the results
shown in the main text, mountain public schools mostly contribute to
the left tail of the distribution. Finally, the distributions of private schools
both for mountain and flat regions are almost identical even though there
are only 449 mountain private schools and one might expect large statis-
tical uncertainty.
Figure 4.14b draws the school-size distribution without considering
geography but only distinguishing with respect to the school-type. Fre-
quencies are then shown for private (red4) and public (green) schools
and compared with the distribution of all the Italian primary schools (in
blu ◦) that replicates Figure 1a in the main text. It confirms that private
schools play only a slight role in generating the left peak which is still
present in the the size distribution of public schools.
Figure 4.15a plots the fraction ηc = nP,c/nc of private schools among
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Figure 4.15: Private schools analysis II. a. The fraction of private schools, ηc =
nP,c/nc among all schools in bin cwith a given altitude above the sea level, χc, with
respect to the total number of schools nc in that bin (∗, blue lines). The distribution
of all the schools among the altitude bins nc/N (, magenta lines). b. The fraction
of private schools ηc = nP,c/nc among all schools in bin c, formed by comuni with
a given number of inhabitants, pc. As a robust check we also plot in () magenta
the distribution of schools (both private and public) in each bin c, nc/N , versus the
population.
all schools (public and private) in each bin c of comuni with given alti-
tude, against their altitude above the sea level, χc. In order to reduce the
noise, we binned comuni according to the altimetry:
c = {∀ k ∈ [1, . . . ,K] : 2c−1 < χk ≤ 2c}. (4.14)
It yields 11 bins, c ∈ [1, . . . , 11], each of them collecting comuni according
to the meters above the sea level. The figure also shows the distribution
nc/N of all the schools among the elevation bins. The figure provides
evidence that the majority of private schools (in ∗ blue) are located in
the comuni with low altitude χc < 128m. In contrast the distribution of
number schools with given altitude (both private and public, in  ma-
genta) reaches the maximum for comuni with altitude χc = 512m. The
hill-shape of this distribution can be explained by the unequal territory
covered by different bins. We conclude that there is a greater fraction of
private schools in the planes than in the mountains.
Finally, using the same binning algorithm in Eq. 4.4, Fig. 4.15b shows
strong positive correlation between the fraction of private schools ηc =
nP,c/nc among all schools in bin c, ηc, of comuni with given number
of inhabitants, pc (in ∗ blue), confirming that the location of the Italian
Catholic private schools mainly roots in the more populated comuni.f As
a robust check we also plot in () magenta the distribution, nc/N , of all
schools (both private and public) among population bins c, which, con-
sistently with the analysis of Fig. 4.4-4.5, yields the Italian city-population
distribution which has a slightly skewed shape. In very small comuni
(pc < 104), where a greater quantity of schools is provided, we count
only a small fraction of private ones. Conversely, the fraction of private
schools in the large comuni is very large (e.g. private schools consti-
tute 30% of all schools located in Rome, in comparison to the 9% nation-
wide).
Large flat comuni are then very likely to be the places where most of
Italian private primary schools are located. We conclude that privatiza-
tion has been driven across the years for religious confessional purposes
rather than following the unmatched education demand in the country-
side due to the lack of the public system.
4.5.2 Testing unimodality in the school-size distributions
of flat comuni.
In this section we address concerns on bimodality on the school-size dis-
tribution of flat comuni. In the section 4.2.2 we have demonstrated that
geography is the main source of bimodality in the school-size pdf show-
ing that mountain schools clusterize aroundm1. Yet there might be other
confounding factors that might keep a second peak, i.e. m1, in the school-
size pdf of the schools that reside in flat comuni.
In Fig. 4.6b we distribute schools according to the number of stu-
dents, xi, conditional on the altimetry of comuni. As we discuss in the
section 4.2.1 this analysis gives five distributions which correspond to
different elevation bins. The PDFs of mountain schools stand on the
left and on the right we have flat schools. The (◦) green line shows the
school-size distribution for N250m = 3, 033 schools that reside in comuni
with around 250 meters from the sea level. Despite this PDF does not
show a sharp peak corresponding to m2, and thus potentially might be
bimodal, here we demonstrate that statistically the hypothesis in favor of
unimodality can not be rejected.
To see that we use the complementary error function to estimate the
probability that the number of schools in the central bin n1 is not signif-
icantly smaller than and the numbers of schools in the neighboring two
bins n2, n3 are not significantly larger than a certain number n∗ provided
that the standard deviation of the number of schools in these bins due to
small statistics is
√
n∗:
p(n∗) =
1
2
Πierfc
( |ni − n∗|√
2n∗
)
(4.15)
This is equivalent to test the hypothesis that the distribution is unimodal.
In the school-size distribution for schools that reside in comuni with
around 250 meters above the sea, the central bin collects n1 = 639 schools.
On either sides there are two other bins that collect n2 = 670 and n3 =
646 respectively. The probability that the distribution is not bimodal is
maximum for n∗ = 646 where it is equal to pmax(n∗ = 646) = 0.15.
Fixing a level of confidence of 0.10 we, therefore, cannot reject the hy-
pothesis of unimodality.

Bibliography
[1] Gabaix, X., Power Laws in Economics and Finance., Annu. Rev. Econ.
1, 255–93, (2009). 105
[2] Gabaix, X., Zipf’s Law for Cities: An Explanation., Q J Econ. 114, 739–
67, (1999). 105, 113, 115
[3] Allen, P.M., Cities and regions as self-organizing systems: models of com-
plexity, (Routledge, 1997). 105, 113, 115
[4] Amaral, L. A. N., et al., Power Law Scaling for a System of Interacting
Units with Complex Internal Structure., Phys. Rev. Lett.. 80, 1385–1388
(1998). 105
[5] Byrne, D., Complexity theory and the social sciences: an introduction,
(Routledge, 2002). 105
[6] Caves, R. E., Industrial Organization and New Findings on the
Turnover and Mobility of Firms., J Econ Lit. 36, 1947–82, (1998). 105
[7] Bak, P., How nature works, (Oxford University Press, 1997). 105
[8] Kauffman, S., At Home in the Universe: The Search for the Laws of Self-
Organization and Complexity: The Search for the Laws of Self-Organization
and Complexity., (Oxford University Press, 1996). 105
[9] Gazzetta Ufficiale, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica del 20 marzo
2009 n. 81, (2 luglio 2009). 105
137
[10] Disposizioni concernenti la riorganizzazione della rete scolastica, la
formazione delle classi e la determinazione degli organici del person-
ale della scuola., Decreto Ministeriale 331, (24 luglio 1998). 105
[11] Belmonte, A. & Pennisi, A., Education reforms and teachers needs:
a longterm territorial analysis., IJRS. 12, 87-114 (2013). 105
[12] De Wit, G., Firm Size Distributions: An Overview of Steady-State
Distributions Resulting form Firm Dynamics Models., Int J Ind Organ.
23, 423–50 (2005).
[13] Fu, D. et al., The growth of business firms: Theoretical framework
and empirical evidence., Proc Natl Acad Sci USA. 102, 18801–18806
(2005). 106, 110
[14] Gazzetta Ufficiale, Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica dell’8 marzo
1999 n. 275, (10 Agosto 1999). 108
[15] Pitman, E. J. G., The estimation of the location and scale parameters
of a continuous population of any given form., Biometrika 30, 391–421
(1939). 109
[16] Stanley, M. H. R. et al., Zipf plots and the size distribution of firms.,
Econ Lett. 49, 453–457 (1995). 109
[17] Gibrat R., Les Ine´galite´s e´conomiques, (Recueil Sirey 1931).
[18] Sutton, J., Gibrat’s Legacy., J Econ Lit. 35, 40–59 (1997).
[19] Fu, D. et al., A Generalized Preferential Attachment Model for Busi-
ness Firms Growth Rates-I. Empirical Evidence., Eur Phys J B. 57, 127–
130 (2007).
[20] Pammolli, F. et al., A generalized preferential attachment model for
business firms growth rates: II. Mathematical treatment., Eur Phys J B.
57, 131–138 (2007). 110, 111
[21] Axtell, R. L., Zipf Distribution of U.S. Firm Sizes., Science 293, 1818–
20 (2001). 110
[22] Growiec, J., Pammolli, F., Riccaboni, M. & Stanley, H.E., On the Size
Distribution of Business Firms., Econ Lett. 98, 207–12 (2007). 110
[23] Stanley, M. H. R., et al., Scaling behaviour in the growth of compa-
nies., Nature 379, 804–6 (1996). 110
[24] Ayebo, A. & Kozubowski, T.J., An asymmetric generalization of
Gaussian and Laplace laws., J. Probab. Stat. Sci. 1, 187–210 (2003). 111
[25] Buldyrev, S. V., Pammolli, F., Riccaboni, M., & Stanley, H. E., The
Rise and Fall of Business Firms, To be Published (2014). 112
[26] Wang, J., Wen, S., Symmans, W. F., Pusztai, L. & Coombes, K. R.,
The bimodality index: a criterion for discovering and ranking bimodal
signatures from cancer gene expression profiling data., Cancer Inform
7, 199–216 (2009). 113
[27] Clauset, A., Shalizi, C. R. & Newman, M. E. J., Power-law distribu-
tions in empirical data., SIAM review. 51, 661–703 (2009). 113
[28] Eeckhout, J., Gibrat’s Law for (All) Cities., Am Econ Rev. 94, 1429–51
(2004). 113, 115
[29] Reed, W. J., The Pareto, Zipf and Other Power Laws., Econ Lett. 74,
15–9 (2001). 113, 115
[30] Black, S. E., Do better schools matter? Parental valuation of elemen-
tary education., Q J Econ. 114, 577-599 (1999). 128

Unless otherwise expressly stated, all original material of whatever
nature created by Alessandro Belmonte and included in this thesis,
is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution Noncommercial
Share Alike 2.5 Italy License.
Check creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/2.5/it/ for the legal
code of the full license.
Ask the author about other uses.
